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THE GOLDILOCKS APPROACH: FINDING THE
"JUST RIGHT" LEGAL LIMIT ON
NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENTS IN SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CASES
Rachel S. Spooner*
ABSTRACT

Nondisclosure agreements have been used with little notice for
decades to protect trade secrets and confidential business information.
The #MeToo movement revealed the widespread use of nondisclosure
agreements to silence the accusers in workplace sexual harassment and
sexual assault claims. We read with horror about sexual predators who
were enabled by nondisclosure agreements. What was once an innocuous
provision in an employment contract became a silencing tool that
cultivated cultures of harassment and allowed sexual predators to carry on
in our workplaces. Given the understandable outrage at this use of
contract law, many have called for a total ban on the use of NDAs. Several
state legislatures responded with legislation that limits the use of
nondisclosure agreements in sexual harassment cases. At the same time,
advocates for accusers have argued that nondisclosure agreements are
essential to protecting privacy and negotiating settlements. Although
well-intended, the current legislative efforts fail to strike the proper
balance of the competing needs of preventing serial workplace harassment
and protecting the interests of accusers. Others have advocated for using
the courts to limit enforcement of NDAs, relying on common law defenses
to contracts such as unconscionability or the public policy exception. This
paper examines why those common law defenses would be ineffective,
compares efforts to limit nondisclosure agreements in securities
regulation to provide policy context, and evaluates the many different

*Rachel Spooner is an Associate Professor of the Practice in Business Law at Boston College. This
article would not be possible without the significant contributions by her former student, Julian
Burlando-Salazar, Questrom School of Business, Boston University, Class of 2020.
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approaches of the state legislatures, in order to recommend a multi-faceted
legislative approach to limiting nondisclosure agreements.
INTRODUCTION

Gretchen Carlson was a successful television news anchor, first at
CBS News and then as a co-host for Fox News's hit morning show Fox
& Friends starting in 2005.1 In July 2016, Carlson filed a sexual
harassment lawsuit against the chairman and C.E.O. of Fox News, Roger
Ailes.2 Carlson alleged that Ailes had sexually harassed her since she
started work at Fox News.3 Ailes's harassment began with comments on
Carlson's appearance, suggesting that she wear tight outfits when she was
first hired.4 Later, Carlson complained to Ailes about her male co-host on
the popular morning show Fox & Friends, telling Ailes that her 2009 cohost Steve Doocy was condescending.5 Ailes's response was to call
Carlson a "man hater" and to demote her in 2013 from Fox & Friends to
hosting a show at an undesirable 2 p.m. time slot.6 Carlson decided to
fight back and in 2014, she began recording her conversations with Ailes. 7
She captured Ailes making harassing comments such as, "'I think you and
I should have had a sexual relationship a long time ago, and then you'd be
good and better and I'd be good and better. Sometimes problems are easier
to solve' that way," and "I'm sure you can do sweet nothings when you
want to." 8 Armed with this powerful evidence, Carlson filed her lawsuit
against Ailes in 2016.'
Carlson knew that her experience with Ailes was not unique.
Rumors abounded that Ailes asked female employees to "twirl" for him
so he could evaluate their appearance and that he asked for sexual favors
in return for opportunities for air time on the network.10 In fact, when Fox
News launched an internal investigation, more than two dozen women
told the outside counsel about harassment by Ailes.11 Within days, Ailes

1. Gabriel Sherman, The Revenge of Roger's Angels, N.Y. MAG. (Sept. 5, 2016), http://
nymag.com/intelligencer/2016/09/how-fox-news-women-took-down-roger-ailes.html.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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was fired by the owners of 2 1 st Century Fox, the parent company of Fox
13
News. 12 But the problems at Fox News went beyond one person.
Former anchor Andrea Tantaros, "who says she was demoted and
smeared in the press after she rebuffed sexual advances from Ailes," said
of the Fox News culture: "behind the scenes, it operates like a sex-fueled,
Playboy Mansion-like cult, steeped in intimidation, indecency and
misogyny."14

Given the pervasive and long-lasting culture of harassment at Fox
News, removing Ailes did not solve the network's problems. 5 2 1st
Century Fox agreed to settle the lawsuit with Carlson on behalf of Ailes,
reportedly paying Carlson $20 million dollars and making an
unprecedented public apology.' 6 in return, Carlson signed a nondisclosure agreement that prohibited her from discussing any of her
experiences while working at Fox News. 7 Carlson retained the right to
discuss sexual harassment generally.' Carlson's story has been made into
both a television mini-series and a film, but she is unable to speak to the
creators of the projects, confirm whether the show or movie are accurate,
or in any way discuss the way her own story is being portrayed for the
public.' 9 Carlson now says she regrets signing the non-disclosure
agreement, which she did long before #MeToo ignited a global dialogue
about sexual harassment.20
A non-disclosure agreement (hereinafter "NDA") is a written form
of a restrictive covenant that creates a confidential agreement between two
or more parties that prevents sharing information without proper
authorization. 2' Historically used to protect corporate information and
trade secrets, NDAs have morphed into a powerful tool for silencing
12. Sherman, supra note 1.
13. Gabriel Sherman, Fox News Host Andrea Tantaros Says She Was Taken Off the Air After
Making Sexual-Harassment Claims Against Roger Ailes, N.Y. MAG. (Aug. 8, 2016), https://
nymag.com/intelligencer/2016/08/andrea-tantaros-made-harassment-claims-against-roger-

ailes.html.
14. See Sherman, supra note 1.
15. Id.
16. Sarah Ellison, Fox Settles with Gretchen Carlson for $20 Million - and Offers an
Unprecedented Apology, VANITY FAIR (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/09

/fox-news-settles-with-gretchen-carlson-for-20-million.
17.
12,

Gretchen Carlson, Gretchen Carlson:Fox News, I Want My Voice Back, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
2019),
https://www.nytimes.comI2019/12/12/opinion/gretchen-carlson-bombshell-

movie.html?smid--nytcore-ios-share.
18. Id.
19.

Id.

20. Id.
21.

NondisclosureAgreement, CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www. law. cornell.edu/wex

/nondisclosure-agreement (last visited Apr. 22, 2020).
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sexual harassment accusers. 22 This use of NDAs - asking sexual
harassment accusers to agree to silence in exchange for settlement
payments - has allowed "sex-fueled, Playboy Mansion-like cult, steeped
in intimidation, indecency and misogyny ' 23 cultures, like that of Fox
News, to thrive for decades across many industries.
As Carlson notes in her New York Times Op-Ed calling for Fox
News to release her from her NDA, the #MeToo movement has revealed
this pernicious use of contract law. 24 Carlson, along with many other
advocates, is now calling for changes to the law to prohibit the use of
mandatory NDAs and forced arbitration clauses (another way to silence
accusers) in employment contracts.25 Others object to the use of NDAs in
settlement agreements. 26 Although there have been several bills
introduced in Congress and many states have passed new legislation to
cases, those laws vary and
address the use of NDAs in sexual harassment
27
policy.
best
the
on
agreement
there is little
In an entirely different context, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (hereinafter "SEC") has banned the use of NDAs in
securities regulation violations. 28 Rather than banning the enforcement of
an NDA, the SEC has made it illegal to merely ask an employee to enter
into such an agreement. 29 The SEC Rule 2 1F-1 7(a) acknowledges that the
threat of litigation around an NDA, even if ultimately unenforceable, has
the effect of chilling the reporting of wrongdoing.3 ° Thus, the SEC has
enforced its rule against companies that never tried to enforce the NDA,
but merely asked employees to sign the agreement.31
Although the SEC's total ban has its benefits, sexual harassment
accusers may prefer NDAs because silence is their only leverage in a
settlement negotiation and the accusers may want to protect their own
privacy. Thus, a total ban on the use of NDAs in sexual harassment cases

22.

Nondisclosure Agreement, supra note 21.

23.

See Sherman, supra note 1.

24.

Carlson, supra note 17.
Id.
See Hiba Hafiz, How Legal Agreements Can Silence Victims of Workplace Sexual Assault,

25.

26.
THE

ATLANTIC

(Oct.

18,

2017),

https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/10/legal-

agreements-sexual-assault-ndas/543252/.
27. Elizabeth A. Harris, Despite #MeToo Glare, Efforts to Ban Secret Settlements Stop Short,
N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/14/arts/metoo-movement-nda.html.
28. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-17(a) (2012).
29. Id.
30. Thomas White, SEC enforcement actions under exchange act rule 21F-17, 18 J. INV.
COMPLIANCE 1, 1 (2017).

31.

Id. at 1-2.
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is unlikely to solve the competing legal, policy, and ethical concerns that
32
arise from the problem of workplace sexual harassment.
Through evaluation of the new statutes regulating NDAs in sexual
harassment cases and a comparison to the SEC's efforts, this paper
advocates for a multi-faceted approach to the legal, policy, and ethical
challenge of the use of NDAs in sexual harassment cases. In Section I,
this paper reviews the history of NDAs.33 Section II explains, using
current examples from the news, the expansion of the use of NDAs into
sexual harassment cases.34 Section III sets forth the legal framework for
enforcement of NDAs, and evaluates the ability of accusers to use
exceptions or defenses in contract law to invalidate those NDAs.35 In
Section IV, this paper summarizes the recent legislative efforts to reform
the use of NDAs in sexual harassment cases.36 The paper then explains
the SEC's rules prohibiting the use of NDAs in Section V, providing a
comparison to the efforts in the sexual harassment context.3 7 Finally, in
Section VI, this paper recommends a three-pronged approach of 1) limits
on the use of NDAs in the sexual harassment context; 2) notification of
all employees of their rights under the NDA laws; and 3) public reporting
requirements for employers, to prevent the silencing of accusers that leads
to the cultivation of cultures that allow workplace sexual harassment.3 8
I.

HISTORY AND EXPANSION OF NON-DISCLOSURE
AGREEMENTS

The origin of NDAs is not easily pinpointed, however, their early
media mentions began around the 1940s regarding maritime law and
confidentiality.39 For example, in 1949 the Third Circuit Appeals Court
upheld the authority of a confidentiality requirement for maritime
admirals during interrogatory fact findings of whether prospective witness
testimonies were obtainable under the United States Admiralty Rule 31 .40

32. See Areva Martin, How NDAs Help Some Victims Come ForwardAgainst Abuse, TIME
(Nov. 28, 2017), https://time.com/5039246/sexual-harassment-nda/.
33. See infra Section I.
34. See infra Section I.
35. See infra Section HI.
36. See infra Section IV.
37. See infra Section V.
38. See infra Section VI.
39. Michelle Dean, Contracts of Silence, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., https://www.cjr.org
/special-report/nda-agreement.php (last visited Apr. 22, 2020).
40. See Alltmont v. U.S., 177 F.2d 971, 978 (3d Cir. 1949).
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Over time, NDAs popularized for their use in business to protect trade
secrets.4 1 Trade secrets:
derive independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use, and is the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.42
The use of NDAs to protect trade secrets is one avenue to maintain
or obtain an economic advantage over another business.43 But NDAs may
not be necessary to protect trade secrets, as statutory protection exists; the
misappropriation and theft of trade secrets are protected against by the
1979 Uniform Trade Secrets Act44 and the 2016 Defend Trade Secrets
Act.4 5 Nonetheless, NDAs to protect trade secrets are frequently used in
innovative sectors of business and technology.4 6
As NDAs moved beyond their original use for maritime admirals and
into the business sector, these types of contracts have become increasingly
common. 4 7 The use of NDAs is prevalent across many industries and
roles within a company.48 One study found that 87.1 percent of all CEO
contracts prevent them from disclosing confidential information.49
Indeed, the study's authors found NDAs more prevalent than
noncompetition agreements because NDAs are easier to enforce.5"
Although no study has been done regarding the prevalence of NDAs
below the CEO level, the authors suggest that given the strong negotiation
power of CEOs, it is likely they have more favorable contractual terms
than other employees. 5' Thus, we can speculate that NDAs may be at least
41.

Dean, supra note 39.

42.

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM TRADE

SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS 5 (1985), found at https://www.uniformlaws.org
/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=e19b2528-eObl -005423c4-8069701 a4b62&forceDialog=0.
43. See RRK Holding Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 563 F. Supp. 2d 832, 835 (N.D. Il1.2008).
44.

Peter J. Toren, Definition of a 'Trade Secret' Under the DTSA, IP WATCHDOG (May 24,

2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/05/24/defintion-trade-secret-dtsa/id=69262/.
45. Defend Trade Secret Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (2016).
46. See generally RRK Holding Co., 563 F. Supp. 2d at 834 ("Plaintiff alleged that Defendant
breached the Non-disclosure Agreement (Count 1) and mis-appropriated Plaintiff's trade secret
(Count 11) by disclosing Plaintiffs next generation combination power tool.").
47. Norman D. Bishara et al., An Empirical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses and Other
Restrictive Postemployment Covenants, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1, 19-21 (2015).

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 3.
Id.at4.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 3 n.1.
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as or more prevalent below the CEO level. Although, there are many
52
legitimate uses of NDAs, recent cases involving sexual harassment
illustrate that the use of NDAs has broadened beyond protection of trade
secrets into an effort to keep illegal or unethical behavior quiet.53

II.

THE USE

OF

NDAs

TO

SILENCE

SEXUAL HARASSMENT

ACCUSATIONS

The #MeToo54 movement and its corresponding news stories have
revealed the adverse effects of NDAs used for silencing whistleblowers
and shrouding years of sexual harassment. Several recent examples are
illustrative of this expansion of the use of NDAs into more nefarious
territory than trade secrets.5 5 As discussed above, Gretchen Carlson, a
former Fox News anchor, is unable speak about years of harassment by
Ailes because of the NDA she signed to settle her sexual harassment
lawsuit.5 6 McKayla Maroney, Olympic gold medalist and one of over 100
women who accused Larry Nassar, USA Gymnastics team doctor, of
sexual abuse, was also forced into signing non-disparagement and
confidentiality agreements to hide such abuse.57 As emphasized by these
examples, NDAs have deviated from their conventional use of protecting
trade secrets into suppressing victims of sexual harassment, assault, and
abuse.5 8
One example of the systematic use of NDAs to hide sexual
misconduct was detailed in the Massachusetts Gaming Commission's

52. See discussion infra Section II. As the stories below illustrate, many of the cases that
emerged in the #MeToo movement involved more than harassment and included allegations of assault
and rape. Because it is the broader workplace issue relevant to the use of NDAs, and the conduct most
legislative reform focuses upon, we will use the term sexual harassment throughout this paper. But
this shortened reference is not intended to underestimate the severity of the conduct that NDAs have
been used to silence.
53. See discussion infra Section II.
54. See ME Too, https://metoomvmt.org/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2020).
55. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 17 (highlighting how a non-disclosure agreement prevented
Gretchen Carlson from being able to speak about the repeated sexual harassments committed by Fox
News anchor Roger Ailes).
56. Stacy Perman, #MeToo law restrictsuse ofnondisclosureagreements in sexual misconduct
cases, L.A. TIMEs (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/business/hollywood/la-fi-ct-ndahollywood-20181231-story.html.
57. Mahita Gajanan, Chrissy Teigen Just Offered to Pay McKayla Maroney 's PotentialFine
For Discussing Sexual Abuse, TIME (Jan. 16, 2018), http://time.com/5104941/chrissy-teigenmckayla-maroney-nda-fine/.
58. See Dean, supra note 39 (recognizing that over time non-disclosure agreements moved from
the technology industry and into the business landscape, in order to shield misdeeds from public
view).
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report on Wynn Resorts, made public on April 30, 2019."9 That report
summarized the Commission's investigation and hearing regarding
allegations of repeated sexual harassment and rape by Steve Wynn,
founder and former CEO of Wynn Resorts.6 ° The investigation began in
response to a January 2018 article in the Wall Street Journalthat detailed
numerous allegations of sexual harassment and rape by Mr. Wynn against
Wynn Resorts employees.6 In one such allegation, a manicurist at the
resort in Las Vegas stated that after she gave Mr. Wynn a manicure in
2005, he forced her to have sex with him on the massage table he kept in
his office suite.6 2 She later made a complaint to the human resources
department.63 Within days of an internal investigation, Mr. Wynn entered
into a settlement with the manicurist and her husband that included a
retraction, an NDA and a structured payment schedule for the $7.5 million
settlement.' A year later, a former cocktail server at Wynn Las Vegas
made a similar allegation against Mr. Wynn, which again resulted in a
settlement that included an NDA and payment of $975,000.65 The report
detailed many similar stories in the years following: allegations that Mr.
Wynn sexually assaulted or raped service employees at the Wynn Resorts,
each allegation followed by a quick settlement that included an NDA and
often a structured payment schedule to enforce the NDA over time.66 The
management and Board of Directors of Wynn Resorts knew of these
allegations and settlements, never informed the Commission, and instead
took steps to conceal the allegations against Mr. Wynn.6 7 The
Commission concluded that the company's efforts at secrecy made it
impossible for regulators to do their jobs.6 8 Although the Commission
concluded that Wynn Resorts was entitled to maintain its casino license,

59. MASS. GAMING COMM., INVESTIGATIVE REPORT REGARDING ONGOING SUITABILITY OF
WYNN
MA,
LLC
1 (2019),
https://www.wsj.com/edition/resources/documents/print
/A.%20FINAL%20REPORT%20-%2OFINAL%20REDACTED%20VERSION%203.29.19.pdf.
60. Id.
61. Alexandra Berzon et al., Dozens of People Recount Pattern of Sexual Misconduct by Las
Vegas Mogul Steve Wynn, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 27, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/dozens-ofpeople-recount-pattern-of-sexual-misconduct-by-las-vegas-mogul-steve-wynn- 1516985953.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64.

See MASS. GAMING COMM., supra note 59, at 32.

65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 52.
Id. at 63-84.
Id. at 199.
Id.
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the company was fined $35 million and subject to several conditions.69
Wynn Resorts CEO Matthew Maddox was fined $500,000.70
Perhaps the use of NDAs to hide sexual harassment that brought
most attention to this issue was by Harvey Weinstein and the Weinstein
Company, the movie production company owned by Weinstein and his
brother.7 1 To date, more than seventy women have accused Weinstein of
sexual harassment, assault, or rape.72 Weinstein was convicted in a New
York state court of first-degree criminal sexual act and third-degree rape
of two of those women in February 2020, and later sentenced to twentythree years in prison.7 3 Weinstein and the Weinstein Company used
NDAs to silence his accusers for more than twenty years before journalists
brought the pattern of abuse to light.74
The Weinstein NDAs were extremely restrictive, going to great
lengths to prevent disclosure of the allegations.75 Most prevented the
accuser from keeping a copy of the NDA itself.76 In one settlement,
Fillipina - Italian model Ambra Battilana Gutierrez, agreed to remain
silent about an incident during which "Weinstein groped her breasts and
tried to stick his hand up her skirt;" and she was required to destroy any
and all copies of audio recordings of Weinstein admitting to the groping.77
The NDA also required that Gutierrez surrender her phone, passwords to

69. See Steph Solis, The $35M fine was just part of the deal; Here are the conditions Wynn
Resorts has to fulfill to run Encore Boston Harbor, MASSLIVE (May 1, 2019), https://
www.masslive.com/casinos/2019/05/the-35m-fine-was-just-part-of-the-deal-here-are-theconditions-wynn-resorts-has-to-fulfll-to-run-encore-boston-harbor.htm]. The Gaming Commission
required that Wynn keep the CEO and chairman position separate as long as the license agreement
lasts. Id. Wynn was also asked to make changes to its human resource policies, the use of outside
attorneys, as well as the use ofNDAs. Id. Wynn was also required to notify the agency of any civil
or criminal complaint. Id. Finally, it had to pay for an independent monitor to oversee the company's
adherence to these changes. Id.
70. See id.
71. Ronan Farrow, Harvey Weinstein's Secret Settlements, NEW YORKER (Nov. 21, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/harvey-weinsteins-secret-settlements.
72. The women who have accused Harvey Weinstein, SKY NEWS (Jul. 12, 2018), https://
news.sky.com/story/weinstein-who-has-accused-disgraced-movie-mogul- 11385259.
73. Jan Ransom, Harvey Weinstein's Stunning Downfall: 23 Years in Prison,N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/1 /nyregion/harvey-weinstein-sentencing.html.
74. See Farrow, supranote 71.
75. Id.
76. Holly Watt, Harvey Weinstein aide tells of 'morally lacking' non-disclosure deal, THE
GUARDIAN (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/film/2018/mar/28/harvey-weinsteinassistant-zelda-perkins-i-was-trapped-in-a-vortex-of-fear.
77. See Farrow, supra note 71. Gutierrez initially reported the incident to the police, who asked
her to record conversations with Weinstein in an effort to obtain evidence of his harassment. Id. The
New York District Attorney ultimately decided not to prosecute Weinstein, and Weinstein insisted
that Gutierrez destroy all of her copies. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2020

9

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYENTLA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 37:2

her e-mail account and any other form of digital communication to a
private-security firm retained by Weinstein. 78 Finally, the NDA included
a "sworn statement, pre-signed by Gutierrez, [] attached to the agreement,
to be released in the event of any breach. It states that the behavior
79
Weinstein admits to in the audio tape never happened."
Some Weinstein NDAs required silence beyond the accuser.8" Zelda
Perkins, a former assistant to Weinstein, threatened legal action after the
assistant Perkins hired "emerged from her first meeting alone with
Weinstein distraught, saying that he had sexually assaulted her in his hotel
room."8 1 After a lengthy negotiation, the women agreed to settle for two
hundred and fifty thousand British pounds (split between them evenly),
which came from Weinstein's brother's personal bank account to hide the
payment from the Weinstein Company board.82 The settlement included
an NDA that required the women to have "any of their lawyers,
accountants, and therapists who might become aware of the settlement
sign their own nondisclosure agreements."83 The NDA further required
that the women personally make calls "to tell [them] to shut up. 84
When Bill O'Reilly, former Fox News commentator, settled multiple
sexual harassment lawsuits against him, the settlements included similarly
restrictive NDAs. 85 The O'Reilly NDAs required that the accusers "turn
over all evidence, including audio recordings and diaries, to Mr.
O'Reilly., 86 At least one woman was further "required to disclaim the
materials 'as counterfeit and forgeries' if [the evidence] ever became
87
public."
The use of NDAs in response to claims of sexual harassment is not
limited to the entertainment industry. At least half a dozen female
entrepreneurs seeking funding accused Silicon Valley venture capitalist
Justin Caldbeck of sexual harassment.8 8 One of the accusers, Stitch Fix
78. See Farrow, supra note 71.
79. See id.
80. See generally id. (discussing the nondisclosure agreement which Harvey Weinstein's
formal assistant signed).
81.

Id.

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Emily Steel, How Bill O'Reilly Silenced His Accusers, N.Y. TtMES (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/business/media/how-bill-oreilly-silenced-his-accusers.html
(discussing the settlement agreements between Bill O'Reilly and two women).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See generally Minda Zetlin, Stitch Fix Founder Katrina Lake Was Coerced Into Silence
Over VC Justin Caldbeck's Sexual Harassment, INC. (Jul. 2, 2017), https://www.inc.com/minda-
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founder Katrina Lake, reported that ,when she complained about
Caldbeck's harassment and asked for him to be removed from Stitch Fix's
board of directors, the venture capital firm that employed Caldbeck at the
time presented her with a non-disparagement agreement but did remove
him. 9 Also in Silicon Valley, venture capital firm Kleiner Perkins offered
to settle former employee Ellen Pao's sexual harassment lawsuit only if
she signed an NDA, according to Pao's reports.9 ° Pao refused to settle
and ultimately lost her claim at trial.9" Even academia is not immune from
the use of NDAs.92 In Britain, the BBC found that United Kingdom
universities spent 87 million pounds on settlements of sexual harassment
claims with NDAs from 2017 through April 2019. 9'
The use of NDAs also goes beyond settlement of sexual harassment
claims. 94 All of the Weinstein Company's employees signed NDAs that
included an unusual provision restricting disclosure of information
"concerning the personal, social or business activities" of Weinstein and
his brother as co-Chairmen. 9' While it is typical for employment contracts
to include NDAs to protect company trade secrets and confidential
business information, these contracts are rarely used to hide information
about executives' personal lives. 96 Like the Weinstein Company,
President Donald Trump has also used NDAs to prevent prior private and
government employees from disparaging him or his family. 97
We only know about the use of NDAs in sexual harassment cases
because the #MeToo movement has encouraged -victims of workplace
98
sexual harassment to expose the use of NDAs to compel their silence.

zetlin/stitch-fix-founder-had-to-choose-between-speaking-.html

(discussing multiple accusations

against Justin Caldbeck).

89. Id.
90. See Daniel Hemel, Hemel: Should Weinstein-shielding Confidentiality Agreements Be
Legal?, U. OF CH. L. SCH. (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/hemel-shouldweinstein-shielding-confidentiality-agreements-be-legal.
91.

See David Streitfeld, Ellen Pao Loses Silicon Valley Bias Case Against Kleiner Perkins,

N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/O3/28/technology/ellen-pao-kleinerperkins-case-decision.html.
92. See Rianna Croxford, UK universitiesface "gagging order" criticism, BBC NEWS (Apr.
17, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/education-47936662.
93. Id.
94. See Farrow, supra note 71.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Orly Lobel, Trump's Extreme NDAs, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 4, 2019), https://
www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/03/trumps-use-ndas-unprecedented/583984/.
98. See Matthew Garrahan, Harvey Weinstein: how lawyers kept a lid on sexual harassment
claims, FIN. TiMES (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/ldc8a8ae-b7eO-11e7-8c125661783e5589.
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Several public figures spoke out against their harassers and about the
NDAs that tried to force their silence.9 9 Rose McGowan was one of the
first to speak out against Weinstein." °° McGowan received an $100,000
settlement in response to her accusation that Weinstein raped her in 1997,
but the settlement did not include an NDA.' 0 ' In 2017, days before
multiple women would come forward accusing Weinstein of harassment,
rape, and assault, Weinstein reached out with an offer of $1 million in
exchange for McGowan signing an NDA. 102 McGowan countered, asking
for $6 million, but then withdrew the counteroffer within a day of The
New York Times publishing its first article about Weinstein's decades of
alleged harassment.'0 3 Zelda Perkins, another one of Weinstein's
accusers, has also spoken out in defiance of her NDA to highlight the
ethical illegitimacy of NDAs and to advocate for a ban on NDAs in sexual
harassment cases. 0 4 After years of silence, Perkins decided to publicly
break her NDA in a 2017 interview with the Financial Times.10 5
Emboldened by the many other accusers and by Weinstein's firing,
Perkins detailed the exhausting, lengthy, and intense negotiation sessions
where the then-24-year-old, feeling isolated and intimidated, eventually
signed the NDA. °6 Since breaking her NDA Perkins has advocated in
public, including in testimony before British Parliament for a ban of
NDAs in sexual harassment cases. 10 7 Although Gretchen Carlson has
been careful not to violate her NDA with O'Reilly, she has become an
advocate against the use of mandatory arbitration clauses and NDAs in
sexual harassment cases.'0 8 Eliza Dushku, an actress in the CBS
television show "Bull," risked violating her NDA with CBS when she
wrote a Boston Globe article exposing the sexual harassment she suffered
on set by her co-star, Michael Weatherly, and the $9.5 million settlement
with CBS that followed. 10 9

99. See Susan Dominus, Refusing Weinstein's Hush Money, Rose McGowan Calls Out
Hollywood, N.Y. TIES (Oct. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/28/us/rose-mcgowanharvey-weinstein.html.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See id.
104. Garrahan, supra note 98.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Perman, supra note 56.
108. See Garrahan, supra note 98.
109. See Eliza Dushku, Eliza Dushku: I worked at CBS. I didn't want to be sexually harassed.I
was fired, BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www2.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2018/12/19
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These stories, and so many others from the #MeToo movement, have
exposed the use of NDAs to protect more than trade secrets. 110 These
simple contracts have become tools to silence accusers in sexual
harassment cases, which has enabled the harassers, and the toxic cultures
around them, to continue their illegal and unethical conduct.111 The costs
of silencing sexual harassment accusers are difficult to quantify.
Allowing harassment to continue unabated is "an organizationalstressor
that has significant, negative outcomes."'" 2 In their paper about "Hushing
Contracts," David Hoffman and Eric Lampmann set out the negative
externalities of silencing harassment: increased turnover, increased sick
leave, and decreased productivity. 13 As the public has learned more
about the use of NDAs, many have questioned how these contracts can be
In fact, as will be described below, the
legally enforceable.114
enforcement of NDAs is a straightforward application of basic contract
115
law.
III.

ENFORCEABILITY OF NDAs

Non-disclosure agreements require the essential elements of
contracts to be enforceable. 16 In the American legal system, a contract is
enforceable if it has four elements: offer, acceptance, capacity, and
consideration. 1 I Typically, in an NDA the employer offers specific terms
of employment, severance, or a settlement payment, in exchange for the

/eliza-dushku-responds-what-happened-cbs-took-job-and-because-objected-being-sexuallyharassed-was-fired/OCh7h0pwg4Aq7xfwOUasyO/story.html?p1"=BGMenuArticle.
110. See id.; see also Perman, supra note 56; Garrahan, supra note 98.
111. See Dushku, supra note 109; see also Perman, supra note 56; Garrahan, supra note 98.
112. David A. Hoffman & Eric Lampmann, Hushing Contracts, 97 WASH. U. L. REv. 165, 177
(2019) (quoting Jana L. Raver & Michele J. Gelfand, Beyond the Individual Victim: Linking Sexual
Harassment, Team Processes, and Team Performance, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 387, 388 (2005))
(emphasis added).
113. See id. at 178. (citing U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, REPORT OF THE COCHAIRS OF THE SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 22 (June

2016) (quantifying those costs as $327.1 million over two years)). Hoffman and Lampmann also
identify the "deprivation of survivors' ability to openly and honestly talk about their experiences and
to form coalitions with other survivors" as a cost of NDAs.1d. at 179. The popularity of the #MeToo
Movement confirms the impact of sharing stories of harassment and abuse. Id.
114. See id. at 167.
115. See Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 220 (3d Cir.
2002).
116. Id.
117. See Arthur L. Corbin, Offer andAcceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations, 26
YALE L.J. 169, 171 (1916-1917).
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promise to remain silent."1 8 Generally, acceptance is the agreement to the
terms of the contract offered and returned in a specified manner.119 The
employee (or former employee) accepts the terms of an NDA by agreeing,
typically by signing a written agreement, to remain silent in exchange for
either employment, severance, or a settlement payment. 120 Consideration
12 1
for an enforceable contract is the exchange of value between parties.
The bargained for exchange in an NDA is rarely in doubt: the employee
gives up the legal right to speak in exchange for benefits of employment,
severance, or a settlement payment. 122 Finally, enforceability relies on the
capacity to enter a contract. Capacity requires that a person must be of
minimum age and a sound mind. 123 Corporations are also entitled to enter
contracts, as contract law provides that they have the capacity to offer and
accept contractual terms. 2 4 As these basic rules of contract formation
illustrate, most NDAs will have all of the elements of a properly formed
contract and are easily enforceable under contract law. 125
Given the history of their use, the question of NDA enforceability
has focused on cases involving the disclosure of trade secrets. At least
one court has ruled that NDAs should be subject to the same
reasonableness standard as a non-competition agreement. 126 Indeed,
NDAs and noncompetition agreements are often grouped together by
employers and thus arise together in case law. The more newsworthy and
troubling uses of NDAs - to limit whistleblowers, to hide sexual
harassment claims - have yet to be tested in the courts.127 We can look,
therefore, at cases involving trade secrets or non-competition agreements

118. Perman, supra note 56.
119. Corbin, supranote 117.
120. Perman, supra note 56.
121. See Wisconsin & Michigan Ry. Co. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379, 385 (1903).
122. Id.
123. See Capacity, CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.comell.edu/wex/capacity
(last visited Apr. 22, 2020).
124. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010); see also Sonora
Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824, 830 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
125. Aileene Koh, 11 Mistakes That CouldInvalidate Your NDA, EVERY NDA (Nov. 16,2017),
https://everynda.com/blog/1 1-ways-invalidate-nda/.
126. Id.; see also Cincinnati Tool Steel Co. v. Breed, 482 N.E.2d 170, 175 (I11.App. Ct. 1985).
127. See Sinead Baker, Judge tosses out Stormy Daniels' lawsuit to tearup the NDA to stop her
from talking about her alleged affair with Trump, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 8, 2019), https://
www.businessinsider.com/stormy-daniels-hush-money-lawsuit-trnmp-tossed-2019-3.
Stormy
Daniels did challenge the validity of the NDA she signed that prohibited her from discussing her affair
with President Trump in exchange for $130,000. Id. President Trump had already announced that he
would not enforce that NDA against her (after dropping an earlier lawsuit for $20 million for violation
of the NDA). Id. The Court ultimately dismissed the case as lacking subject matter jurisdiction. Both
sides claimed victory, and there was no precedent formed. Id.
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to understand how courts would likely view NDAs used to maintain the
secrecy of other workplace actions.
In order to enforce a trade secret NDA, the owner of the trade
secret(s) must take reasonable steps to keep the information
confidential.12 8 The information cannot already be in the public domain.
Wright Well Control Services, Inc. (hereinafter "WWCS") lost its claim
against its business partner, Oceaneering International, Inc., when
Oceaneering International used confidential information protected by an
NDA between the parties to develop a new product. The information had
previously been filed in WWCS's patent application; doing so put the
information in the public domain, making it .publicly available and not
confidential. 9 Therefore, the court refused to enforce their NDA. As
seen in WWCS's case, the secrecy of the disclosed information is essential
to the confidential nature and enforceability of an NDA. Although in most
sexual harassment cases, the wrongdoing is kept secret, it is worth noting
that should the information emerge publicly, the NDA would no longer
be enforceable.
Enforceability of an NDA also relies on the specificity and scope of
the agreement.13 ° As with noncompetition agreements, NDAs must be
written with specificity; "catch-all clauses" should be avoided to ensure
enforceability. 3' In Duo-Fast.Carolinas,Inc. v. Scott Hill Hardware&
Supply Co., Scott Hill Hardware sought to restrict Duo-Fast Carolinas
from sharing customer contact information using an NDA in an
employment agreement; the NDA was invalidated because its definitions
of use and disclosure were overbroad.'3 2 The NDA lacked a time or
geographic restriction, and enforcement would result in a total ban on use
of customer contact information.'33 The language used in NDAs must be
clear as to the exact information covered and conduct required to
guarantee enforceability.134

128. See Vermont Microsystems, Inc. v. Autodesk, Inc., 88 F.3d 142, 150 (2d. Cir. 1996); see
also Nondisclosure agreement, NOLO's PLAIN-ENGLISH LAW DICTIONARY, https://www.nolo.com
/dictionary/nondisclosure-agreement-term.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2020).
129. See Wright's Well Control Servs., LLC v. Oceaneering Int'l, Inc., No. 15-1720, 2015 WL
7281618, at *6 (E.D. La. Apr. 19, 2018).
130. See Trailer Leasing Co. v. Assocs. Commercial Corp., No. 96 C 2305, 1996 WL 392135,
at *11 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 1996).
131. See Prod. Action Int'l, Inc. v. Mero, 277 F. Supp. 2d 919, 929 (S.D. Ind. 2003).
132. See Duo-Fast Carolinas, Inc. v. Scott's Hill Hardware & Supply Co., No. 16 CVS 9343,
2018 WL 264607, at *2 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 2,2018).
133. See id.
134. See Lasership, Inc. v. Watson, 79 Va. Cir. 205, 210 (Va. Cir.,Ct. 2009).
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Cases involving trade secrets also demonstrate that the scope of an
NDA must be precise and reasonable. 135 For example, the Illinois Trade
Secrets Act requires the geographic and chronological terms be
reasonable in order for an NDA protecting against the misappropriation
of trade secrets to be enforceable. 136 NDAs in Illinois must specify a
chronological term, most often amounting to a time period less than
forever. 13 7 To the contrary, in Kentucky, the existence of an NDA without
a chronological restriction was not addressed in a case where a company
sought an injunction against a former employee seeking employment with
a competitor. 138 Some states also require geographical reasonableness for
an NDA to be enforceable.1 39 For example, Illinois requires careful
scrutiny of the residual effects of chronological and geographical
conditions to determine reasonableness, 140 however the Georgia Supreme
Court has recognized the necessity of only a chronological term. 4 1
NDAs may also be invalidated on the basis of common law
exceptions to the enforcement of contracts such as duress,
unconscionability, or as against public policy.142 Justice Ginsburg of the
United States Supreme Court suggested in an interview about the #MeToo
movement that "we will see an end to the confidentiality pledge ...I hope
those agreements will not be enforced by courts. 1 4
All of these
exceptions, however, would require an accuser to litigate the
enforceability of the NDA.1 4 4 The expense, time, and risk involved in
litigation make reliance on these common law defenses a poor choice for
limiting the negative uses of NDAs.
Duress extends beyond persuasion and attempts to overcome an
offeree's right to decline an offer, often through threats or coercive

135. See id.
136. Illinois Trade Secrets Act, 765 Il1.Comp. Stat. Ann. 1065/2(d)(2) (West 2009); Thomas &
Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 917, 917-18 (N.D. 111.1999).
137.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 515 (Am. LAW. INST. 1981).

138. Gardner Denver Drum LLC v. Goodier, No. 3:06-CV-4-H, 2006 WL 1005161, at *6 (W.D.
Ky. Apr. 14, 2006).
139. Id.
140. Disher v. Fulgoni, 464 N.E.2d 639, 643 (Il. App. Ct. 1984); Cincinnati Tool Steel Co. v.
Breed, 482 N.E.2d 170, 175 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
141. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Baum, 629 F. Supp. 466,469 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
142. Id.
143. JEFFREY ROSEN, CONVERSATIONS WITH RBG: RUTH BADER GINSBURG ON LIFE, LOVE,
LIBERTY, AND LAW 190 (2019).
144. See Orly Lobel, NDAs Are Out of Control. Here's What Needs to Change, Bus. L. (Jan. 30,

2018), https://hbr.org/2018/01/ndas-are-out-of-control-heres-what-needs-to-change.
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behavior.145 This coercion can be physical or economic.146 A contract is
void due to duress when parties were not on equal terms and the party
seeking to void the contract had no choice but to enter the contract, money
paid or other value parted with, under such pressure, is not regarded as a
voluntary act. 147 Mere conditioning employment on entering into an NDA
is not enough to establish duress.14 8 Stories from the #MeToo movement
do suggest the use of duress in negotiation of the NDA. 149 In particular,
the grueling multiple-day negotiation between Zelda Perkins, her former
assistant, and Weinstein attorneys, has evidence of duress.15 ° The NDA
was reached "after several rounds of negotiations, including one session
that finished at 5 a.m. after 12 hours of debate.151 Perkins said by the end
of the negotiations there was a "siege mentality."' 15 2 Not only was the
negotiation lengthy and exhausting, but Perkins and her young assistant
were brought into a room with Weinstein, who had allegedly sexually
assaulted the assistant, to sign the NDA in his presence.15 3 Although these
facts certainly suggest the NDA was involuntary, duress has not been
tested in court as a defense to the enforcement of an NDA.154
An unconscionable contract lacks fundamental fairness between the
parties and will not be enforced. 15 5 Unconscionability is found from the
oppression and surprise of the offeror to the offeree. 156 Oppression occurs
when one party uses its power over the weaker party and the weaker party

145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 137, § 175.
146. Hall v. Ochs, 817 F.2d 920, 923 (1st Cir. 1987); Oskey Gasoline & Oil Co. v. Continental
Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1281, 1286 (8th Cir. 1976).
147.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 137, § 175.

148. Litig. Reprographics & Support Servs., Inc. v. Scott, 599 So. 2d 922, 923 (La. Ct. App.
1992) (holding that noncompetition agreement was not signed under duress because it was made a
condition of at-will employment).
149. See Michelle Kaminsky, The Harvey Weinstein Effect: The End Of Nondisclosure
Agreements In Sexual Assault Cases, FORBES (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/michellefabio/2017/10/26/the-harvey-weinstein-effect-the-end-of-nondisclosure-agreements-insexual-assault-cases/#745282b2c 1lc.
150.

Id.

151.
152.
153.
154.

See Watt, supra note 76.
Id.
Id.
See generally Vasundhara Prasad, IfAnyone Is Listening,#MeToo: Breaking the Culture of

Silence Around Sexual Abuse through Regulating Non-Disclosure Agreements and Secret

Settlements, 59 B.C. L. REv. 2507, 2537 (2018) (implying that courts do not scrutinize NDAs to
"determine if they were made under duress").
155. Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., 907 P.2d 51, 58 (Ariz. 1995).
156. See Hume v. U.S., 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889) (defining unconscionability to be a contract
which "no man and his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest
and fair man would accept on the other").
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consequences. 1 7
agreement's
of the
therefore unaware
is
Unconscionability can be procedural: occurring during the contract's
formation, or it can be substantive: relating to the contract's content. 158
For example, an employee's arbitration agreement and NDA with
Airtouch Communications was procedurally enforceable but its
confidentiality provision was substantively unconscionable because it
hindered the employee from proving discrimination patterns and from
using information from past arbitrations to do so.159 As it was written, the
confidentiality clause solely benefited Airtouch. 160 Therefore, the
employee was able to invalidate the NDA on the basis of
unconscionability. 16 1 No court has analyzed whether an NDA used in a
sexual harassment case was unconscionable. It may be difficult to
convince a court that an NDA used to settle a sexual harassment lawsuit
solely benefits the accused or employer - benefits to the accuser may
include a payment to the accuser and protection of the accuser's
privacy. 162 The accuser may have a stronger procedural unconscionability
argument given the significant imbalance of power in negotiation of most
NDAs 1 63 Invalidating an NDA on the basis of procedural
unconscionability is fact-specific and would require litigation of this
defense.' 64
A contract, including an NDA, may be invalidated if it is contrary to
the purpose of public policy. 165 Like the use of unconscionability, the
public policy exception is rare. 6 6 Courts have warned against the use of
public policy going back as far as 1824.167 In Richardson v. Mellish, the
court invalidated a contract selling a captain position for an East India
Company ship because of fraudulent consideration and a violation of the
English public policy prohibiting the sale of offices of trust. 168 In Judge
Burrough's dissent he warned against heavy reliance on public policy for
invalidating a contract. 169 Public policy is "a very unruly horse, and when
157. Maxwell, 907 P.2d at 58.
158. Id. at 57-58.
159. Zuver v. Airtouch Comrnc'ns. Inc., 103 P.3d 753, 765 (Wash. 2004).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 769.
162. Prasad, supra note 154, at 2516.
163. Id. at 2538.
164. Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., 907 P.2d 51, 58 (Ariz. 1995).
165. Prasad, supra note 154, at 2528.
166. See Bandera v. City of Quincy, 344 F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 2003) (explaining that "a settlement
agreement might (rarely) be invalid as against public policy").
167. Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229, 242 (1824).
168. Id. at 236-37.
169. Id. at 252 (Burrough, J., dissenting).
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once you get astride it, you never know where it will carry you."' 70 In an
1828 case, Stoddard v. Martin, the public policy exception expanded to
contracts that have a "tendency to a mischievous consequence." 171 Martin
Stoddard and Wheeler Martin placed a wager on whether Ashur Robbins,
a candidate for the 1862 U.S. Senate, would win the Rhode Island
election. 172 When Martin refused to follow through with the wager,
Stoddard sued. 73 The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that of the
wagers deemed illegal, there are those "against a sound policy, or of
immoral tendency, which may affect the feelings, interest or character of
a third party, or tend to disturb the peace of society."'174 The validity of a
contract against public policy is determined by the strength of that policy
from legislation or judicial decisions, the likelihood that its enforcement
would limit a public policy, the seriousness or deliberateness of the
conduct, and the proximity of the misconduct to the contract. 7 5 The
balancing of these factors aims to "protect some aspect of the public
welfare."'1 76 Courts have invalidated contracts contrary to public policy
so as not to contradict the "good of the people" that legislation,
government, and similar policies aim to foster. 177 In 1975, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts emphasized the illegality of a contract
violating public policy where a woman sued the executor of a will for an
oral agreement that created the presumption of an exchange between his
property and sexual intercourse with her. 178 In a very different case,
Allied-Lyons PLC, who sought to acquire Dunkin' Donuts, entered into
an agreement to pay the senior vice president of Dunkin' Donuts a finder's
fee should Allied make the acquisition. 1 79 Their contract interfered with
the senior vice president's ability to carry out his fiduciary duty 18to
0
Dunkin' Donuts and was ruled unenforceable as against public policy.
We have very few examples of NDAs being invalidated as against
public policy. To invoke a public policy exception against the
enforcement of NDAs and noncompetition agreements, courts will look
for well-stated or already settled case law to do so - likely to avoid the

170. Id.
171.

Stoddardv. Martin, 1 R.I. 1, 4 (R.I. 1828).

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Stoddard, 1 R.I. at 1.
Id.
Id. at 2.

177.

MICHAEL HILL, THE PUBLIC POLICY PROCESS (2005).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 137, § 178(3).

Id. § 179(b).

178. Green v. Richmond, 337 N.E.2d 691, 695-96 (Mass. 1975).
179. Geller v. Allied-Lyons PLC, 674 N.E.2d 1334, 1335 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995).
180. Id. at 1336.
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"unruly horse" that was cautioned in Richardson.18 California's public
policy favoring open competition invalidated an employee's NDA and
noncompetition agreement with Arthur Anderson, LLP., because the
NDA prevented him from practicing his profession. 8 2 In this case, the
court specifically cited California Civil Code supporting the legislative
intent for open competition. 183 In Erhart v. Bofi Holding., Inc.,
whistleblowers appropriated documents from their employer in the course
of whistleblowing to the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC").184 The defendants argued that the NDAs should be
unenforceable as against the public policy of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act.185 The court found the jury could
decide that the public policy exception applied, noting the strong public
policy interest articulated in Dodd-Frank in whistleblowing can outweigh
8 6 The
the business interest in an NDA. 1'
Alaska Supreme Court held that
a private agreement that prevented a woman from presenting evidence to
court in a domestic violence case was unenforceable as against the
essential public policy of preventing additional violence.187 Although
preventing domestic violence is a different public policy concern than
sexual harassment, the increased awareness of the prevalence of sexual
harassment, or worse, in the workplace, may allow courts to draw a similar
conclusion.
To date, there is just one case invalidating an NDA that prevented
disclosure of facts related to a sexual harassment case on the basis of
public policy. 88 Long before the #MeToo movement, the First Circuit
invalidated an NDA that prevented cooperation with the EEOC in its
investigation of sexual harassment claims. 89 In EEOC v. Astra USA, Inc.,
the EEOC's investigation of Astra was impeded by several employees
who were unable to cooperate with the investigation because of settlement
agreements that prohibited employees from aiding the EEOC.' 9 ° The
court ruled that those provisions were invalid as against public policy and
181. Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229, 303 (1824).
182. Edwards v. Arthur Andersen, LLP., 189 P.3d 285, 292 (Cal. 2008).
183. Edwards, 189 P.3d at 291 (citing California Business and Profession Code § 16600).
184. Erhart v. Bofi Holding., Inc., No. 15-cv-02287, 2017 WL 588390, at *1 (S.D. Cal. 2017).
185. Id. at *4.
186. Id. at *14.
187. Lana C. v. Cameron P., 108 P.3d 896, 901-02 (Alaska 2005) (invalidating an NDA in a
custody agreement while citing statistic that approximately thirty percent of women murdered in the
United States in a given year lose their lives to husbands or boyfriends in support of the public policy
concerns).

188. EEOC v. Astra USA, Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 740-41 (1st Cir. 1996).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 741.
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affirmed a preliminary injunction against the company. 9 ' The court
balanced the "significant public interest in encouraging communication
with the EEOC against the minimal adverse impact that opening the
channels of communication would have on settlement." 19 2 Although
Astra is a helpful precedent for any accuser attempting to invalidate an
NDA on the basis of public policy, it could be limited to cases where the
EEOC is impeded by the NDA.'93 The public policy concern relied on in
194
Astra was limited to the ability of the EEOC to conduct investigations.
It is not as clear that a court would find an individual plaintiffs sexual
harassment lawsuit or an accuser's desire to go to the press as compelling
a public policy.
If courts were willing to interpret Astra broadly and find that the use
of NDAs in sexual harassment cases brought by private plaintiffs (not the
EEOC) is a violation of public policy, using this common law defense is
not a realistic policy solution. 195 The public policy exception to
enforcement of NDAs requires a court ruling, which inherently requires
litigation. 196 So many of the stories we have learned through the #MeToo
movement involve NDAs signed as a result of an internal complaint. 197
None of Weinstein's accusers sued him before signing an NDA. 19 8 At
Fox News, several of Bill O'Reilly's accusers settled prior to filing
lawsuits. 199 Steve Wynn's accusers signed NDAs after filing internal

191.

Id. at 747.

192.

Id. at 744-45; see also Saini v. Int'l Game Tech., 434 F. Supp. 2d 913, 921 (D. Nev. 2006)

(refusing to invalidate confidentiality agreement on public policy grounds when employee disclosed
trade secrets in part because "[w]hile there is certainly a public interest at stake in uncovering the sale
of defective products, we find that public policy is not as high a priority as enforcement of sexual
harassment law by the EEOC").
193. Astra USA, Inc., 94 F.3dat 745 n.6.
194. See id.
195. But see Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 112 (explaining how the public policy defense
may be effective).
196. See generally Bandera v. City of Quincy, 344 F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 2003) (explaining that
settlement agreements are rarely found invalid on public policy grounds).
197. See generally Emily Steel & Michael S. Schmidt, Bill O'Reilly Thrives at Fox News, Even
as HarassmentSettlements Add Up, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04
/01/business/media/bill-oreilly-sexual-harassment-foxnews.html?action=click&module=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article&region=Footer
(describing
settlement agreements reached at Fox News as a result of internal complaints).
198. See Farrow, supra note 71.
199. See Steel & Schmidt, supra note 197 (citing several settlements that were entered after the
accusers' attorneys contacted the company).
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complaints. 2°° EEOC statistics confirm these anecdotes. 21 The EEOC's
Report on Workplace Harassment found that only "6% to 13% 20of2
individuals who experience harassment file a formal complaint.,
Unlike other forms of litigation, sexual harassment plaintiffs must first go
through the EEOC before they can file a lawsuit in court, adding another
procedural burden to an already reticent accuser. 0 3 Those who endure
sexual harassment may also be deterred from filing a complaint due to the
only about four percent of cases end up
bleak chances of success in court:
2°4
awarding damages to victims.
Relying on a judge to find that the negative externalities of sexual
harassment are a strong enough public policy interest to find an NDA
unenforceable is risky, given how negatively judges have viewed sexual
harassment lawsuits. 2 5 The risk is greater considering the demographics
of our judiciary. Only twenty-seven percent of the federal judiciary is
female.20 6 The state judiciary is only slightly more diverse; as of 2019,
thirty-four percent of state judges were female. 2 7 An article analyzing
sexual harassment appeals in 1999-2001 found that plaintiffs were twice
as likely to win their appeal with a female judge on the panel.20 8 The
narrow view of sexual harassment in the judiciary demonstrates how
difficult it would be for accusers to invalidate NDAs on the basis of public
20 9
policy.
In addition to the common law exceptions that might limit NDAs,
there are statutory exceptions to the enforceability of NDAs.2 1 ° Under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, an NDA may not be used to prevent an

200. See generally MAss. GAINvG COMM., supra note 59, at 26-132 (describing settlement
agreements between Wynn MA LLC and Mr. Wynn's accusers).
201. CHAi R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 16 (2016).

202. Id.
203. Alexia Fernandez Campbell, How the legal system fails victims of sexual harassment,VOX
(Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/12/11/16685778/sexual-harassmentfederal-courts.
204. See id. ("Only about four out of 100 job discrimination lawsuits that aren't settled or
voluntarily dismissed end up providing any kind of relief for workers.").
205. Id.
206. Danielle Root, Women Judges in the FederalJudiciary,CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 17,
2019),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2019/10/161 2 35 3 1
/JudicialDiversityFactsheet-women.pdf.
207. 2019 US State Court Women Judges, NAT'L ASS'N OF WOMEN JUDGES, https://
www.nawj.org/statistics/2019-us-state-court-women-judges (last visited Apr. 22, 2020).
208. Jennifer L. Peresie, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the
FederalAppellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1761 (2005).
209. See Campbell, supra note 203.
210. Lobel, supra note 144.
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employee from assisting in official agency investigations, including filing
charges with or assisting the EEOC in its investigations.21 1 Section 7 of
the National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter "NLRA") gives all
employees the right to engage in concerted activities, including the right
to discuss the terms and conditions of their workplace.2 12 Section 8(a) of
the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for employers to violate the
Section 7 rights of any employee, including those who are not
unionized.213 Courts have found that NDAs signed as a term of
employment violate the NLRA to the extent that those NDAs prevent
employees from discussing the workplace.214 Although the NLRA does
not provide a defense to the enforceability of NDAs signed as part of
settlement agreements, it would prohibit the enforcement of any general
NDAs that include discussion of workplace incidents, such as sexual
harassment.2 15 Finally, the Defend Trade Secrets Act provides a narrow
statutory exception to enforcement of an NDA by providing immunity for
whistleblowers that must disclose trade secrets or violate an NDA in the
course of reporting wrongdoing to the government.2 16
Other than the patchwork of exceptions above, NDAs are enforced
like any other contract under most states' laws.217 Despite the recent
willingness of accusers and witnesses to speak out as part of the #MeToo
movement, NDAs remain a powerful tool of silence. 218 Employers can
use the threat of expensive and labor-intensive legal battles regardless of
whether the NDAs would be unenforceable.2 19 The threat of litigation
compels the whistleblowers or accusers to settle, therefore avoiding the
potential for courts to question NDA enforceability. 22 0 Most employees
are uninformed about their rights with regard to NDAs. and the broad
language of the NDAs may chill protected speech.221 In addition to broad
language, the NDAs often include liquidated damages clauses that allow
211. Id.
212. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1935).
213. 29 U.S.C. § 158(1).
214. See, e.g., Banner Health Sys. v. NLRB, 851 F.3d 35, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
215. Hafiz, supra note 26.
216. Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1833 (2016).
217. Prasad, supra note 154; at 2513.
218. Id. at2509.
219. Id. at 2515.
220. Id. at 2517 (discussing the example of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Albany's
confidential settlement agreement with a victim in order to silence the long-standing abuse endured
and thus avoiding litigation).
221. See Orly Lobel, Enforceability TBD: From Status to Contractin Intellectual PropertyLaw,
96 B.U. L. REV. 869, 875-76, 882 (2016) (discussing lack of knowledge of employees regarding
restrictive agreements including non-competition clauses and NDAs).
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for a high pre-determined amount of damages without any proof of harm
for any breach of the NDA.2 22 For example, in exchange for a $130,000
payment, Stephanie Clifford (also known as Stormy Daniels) entered into
an NDA with President Trump in 2016 in which she agreed to conceal
their affair.2 23 The NDA included a liquidated damages clause that
provided for damages of $1 million for every breach - each time Daniels
disclosed the affair. 224 Regardless of whether they are enforceable,
liquidated damages clauses are likely to chill speech and prevent victims
from coming forward with allegations of harassment or abuse.22 5
The statutory protections in place are often too narrow to be helpful
and accusers are often unaware of their rights.226 The common law
exceptions to enforcement of a contract require expensive, timeconsuming, and risky, litigation.227 Consequently, the enforcement of
NDAs has been a powerful corporate tool for protecting secrets - for both
legitimate and illegitimate business purposes. 228 The ease by which
wrongdoers can use NDAs to protect themselves and the pattems of
harassment that have been enabled by NDAs, call for a reexamination of
the legal standards for enforceability of these contracts beyond their use
to protect a legitimate business interest in trade secrets.2 29
IV.

LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVES FOR LIMITING

NDA's

Given the policy and ethical concerns about the use of NDAs to
prevent accusers and whistleblowers in sexual harassment cases from
testifying, providing evidence, speaking with the press, or warning other
employees, many have called for legislation to limit the use of NDAs.2 3 °
In the wake of the #MeToo movement, several states have passed such
legislation, although the limits on NDAs vary widely.23 Below is a
review of state laws, pending state bills, and a proposed federal law,
regulating the use of NDAs in sexual harassment cases.

222.

Prasad, supra note 154, at 2516.

223.

Vanessa Romo, Stormy DanielsFilesSuit, Claims NDA InvalidBecause Trump Didn 't Sign

At The XXX, NPR (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/03/07/591431710
/stormy-daniels-files-suit-claims-nda-invaid-because-trump-didnt-sign-at-the-xxx.
224. Id.
225. See Harris, supra note 27.
226. See Campbell, supra note 203.
227. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Baum, 629 F. Supp. 466, 471 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
228. See NondisclosureAgreement, supra note 21.
229. Id.
230. See Harris, supra note 27; see also Lobel, supra note 144.
231. See Harris, supra note 27.
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State Laws

As of January 2020, twelve states had passed statutes regulating the
use of NDAs. 232 All were passed in response to the #MeToo movement
and concerns about the ability of sexual harassment to continue because
of NDAs. 233 The states take different approaches and few go so far as to
completely ban NDAs in cases of sexual harassment.2 34 The competing
concerns that most legislators articulated were preventing continued
harassment versus the desire of a victim to remain confidential. 235 The
narrowest statutes prohibit only the use of an NDA to prevent testimony
by a victim in a criminal proceeding, while others ban the use of an NDA
to prohibit participation in employment discrimination, harassment or
retaliation cases. 23 6 Some statutes address only general NDAs - those
included in employment agreements.2 37 Others ban NDAs in settlement
agreements of sexual harassment claims, unless the victim requests the
NDA.2 38 Many statutes addressed both NDAs and mandatory arbitration
agreements, as employers often pair these agreements to ensure
confidentiality in process and outcome. 239 The current state laws are
detailed below.
1. Arizona
Arizona's statute, passed in April 2018, prohibits the use of an NDA
to prevent a victim of sexual assault or harassment from testifying in a
criminal proceeding or responding to a prosecutor's inquiry.2 40 This
narrow construction would likely allow for the enforcement of an NDA to
prevent testimony in a civil case and certainly to prevent the accuser from
speaking with the press. 24 ' The law also prevents government officials
from using public money to settle a sexual harassment or misconduct
claim.24 2 The current version of the statute differs from its original,
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
2019).
238.
239.
purposes
240.
241.
242.

Harris, supra note 27.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See ARTz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-720 (2018); see also CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1001 (West
See OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.370 (2020).
See generally Dean, supra note 39 (discussing the history of NDAs and the purported
they serve employers).
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-720.
See id. § 12-720(A)(1-2).
Id. § 12-720(D).
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unamended bill, which included a prohibition of NDAs in all incidences
of sexual harassment or misconduct, including civil cases. 243 The
reasoning offered for the change was the desire of some victims to have
NDAs in place to protect their confidentiality. 2 "
2.

California

California's law, effective January 1, 2019, prohibits a provision in
a settlement agreement that bars the disclosure of factual information
related to a civil or administrative claim regarding either: 1) an act of
sexual assault, 2) an act of sexual harassment, an act of workplace
harassment or discrimination based on sex, 3) retaliation against a person
for reporting sexual harassment, 4) harassment or discrimination based on
sex by owner of a housing accommodation. 24' Because the law requires
that a claim be filed to invoke this protection, it would not address
situations where the accuser has only complained at the workplace.2 46 For
example, although Gretchen Carlson would have been protected under
this California law because she filed a lawsuit against Roger Ailes, the
two dozen other women who complained about Ailes's sexual harassment
during Fox News's internal investigation would not be protected. 247 The
California statute addresses the concern for victim confidentiality by
including a provision that allows an NDA to be included in a settlement
agreement with regard to the victim's identity at the request of that
victim. 2 48 Finally the statute allows a judge to consider a claim for money
damages for a violation of the NDA ban.249
3. Illinois
The Illinois Workplace Transparency Act bans all nondisclosure or
non-disparagement clauses in agreements between employers and

243. Andrew Nicla, Bill allowing sex harassment victims to break non-disclosure agreements
heads to Ducey, THE REPUBLIC (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics
/arizona/2018/04/12/bill-allowing-sex-assault-harassment-victims-break-non-disclosureagreements-heads-doug-ducey/440055002/.
244. Id.
245. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1001(a)(1-4) (West 2019).
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. Id. § 1001(c).
249. Id. § 1001(f).
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250 It
employees (defined to include independent contractors and the like).
also makes it illegal for an employer to enforce or attempt to enforce such
a clause or retaliate against an employee for assisting in the investigation
of harassment or discrimination. 251 Effective January 1, 2020, the statute
also provides that for NDAs entered prior to that date, those contracts may
be voidable if the party can show duress, incompetency or impairment at
252
The Illinois law has
the time of agreement, or that they were a minor.
if the clauses are
NDAs
allowing
an exception for settlement agreements,
"mutually agreed upon and mutually benefit both the employer and the
employee."25' 3 The employee must have twenty-one days to consider the
25 4
agreement before it is executed and then seven days to revoke.

4.

Maryland

Effective October 1, 2018, Maryland voided any provision in an
employment contract that waives any "substantive or procedural right or
remedy to a claim that accrues in the future of sexual harassment or
retaliation for reporting or asserting a right or remedy based on sexual
harassment., 255 The statute also prohibits retaliation against an employee
25 6 If
who refuses to enter into an agreement that asks for such a waiver.
a provision, it will be liable for the
an employer attempts to enforce such
257
employee's attorney fees and costs. .
Although this statute does not explicitly include NDAs, they are
likely to be included in the statute's broad language. Indeed, the law is
entitled: "Disclosing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace Act of
2018. "258 The statute only applies to NDAs signed as part of employment
agreements, so it does not limit the ability of an employer to enter into a
settlement agreement that includes an NDA.2 59 It also only applies to
with independent
employment relationships, so it would not impact NDAs
260
contractors, vendors, customers, or other third parties.

250. I1. Workplace Transparency Act, Pub. Act. 101-221, 111.Legis. Serv. (West), citing 820
ILCS 96/1-1, et. seq.
Workplace Transparency Act § 1-10(b).
251. Ill.
252. 111.Workplace Transparency Act § 1-15.
253. Id. § 1-25.
254. Id.
255. MD.CODE ANN.LAB. & EMEL. § 3-715(a) (2019).
256. Id. § 3-715(b)(1).
257. Id. § 3-715(c).
258. Id. § 3-715.
259. Id. § 3-715(a).
260. Id.
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In addition to the prohibition of the waiver of rights, the Maryland
statute imposes reporting requirements on employers that have fifty or
more employees. 261 Those large employers must report to the Maryland
Commission on Civil Rights the number of settlements entered after
allegation of sexual harassment by an employee, "the number of times the
employer has paid a settlement to resolve a sexual harassment allegation
against the same employee over the past 10 years of employment," and
the number of settlement agreements that required confidentiality.2 62
The Maryland statute includes the language "except as prohibited by
federal law" in order to address concerns about preemption by federal
law. 263 The implications of this exception will be most impactful on
arbitration clauses that are waivers of the right to a jury trial.26 4 The U.S.
Supreme Court held in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion265 and then
again in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis 266 that the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) strongly favors the enforcement of arbitration clauses. 267 Thus, if
an employment agreement contains a mandatory arbitration clause
covered by the FAA, then the FAA will likely preempt the Maryland
statute, and allow enforcement of the arbitration clause.2 68 There is no
federal law on NDAs, so preemption is not a concern. 26 9
5.

Nevada

Nevada has banned NDAs from settlement agreements if the NDA
"restricts a party from disclosing factual information relating to a claim in
a civil or administrative action" related to conduct that could constitute a
criminal sexual offense, employment discrimination on the basis of sex,
or retaliation by an employer or landlord for reporting sex
discrimination. 270 The Nevada law, effective July 1, 2019, renders all

261.
262.

MD. CODE ANN. LAB. &EEMPL. § 3-715(a) (2019).
"DisclosingSexual Harassment in the Workplace Act of 2018" Employer Disclosure

Survey, ST. OF MD. COMMISSION ON C.R., https://mccr.maryland.gov/Pages/Sexual-Harassment-

Disclosure-Survey.aspx (last visited Apr. 22, 2020).
263. MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 3-715(a).
264. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 342 (2011).
265. Id.
266. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018).
267. Id.
268. See id. at 1619 ("Congress has instructed federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements
according to their terms.").
269. See generally MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 3-715 (2019) (limiting the scope of the
statute to "except as prohibited by federal law").
270. NEV. REV. STAT. § 10.195(1) (2019).
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such NDAs in settlement agreements void and unenforceable.2 71 There
are exceptions in the Nevada law only at the request of the claimant, for
privacy related to the identity of the claimant, or any facts that could
reveal the claimant's identity.272
6. New Jersey
New Jersey passed a reform of its Law Against Discrimination that
bars enforcement of NDAs for all contracts entered into, renewed,
modified or amended on or after March 18, 201 9.273 The statute includes
a broad prohibition against NDAs, stating that any "provision in any
employment contract or settlement agreement which has the purpose or
effect of concealing the details relating to a claim of discrimination,
retaliation, or harassment" is "deemed against public policy and
unenforceable"- against the employee or former employee.2 74 If the
employee reveals "sufficient details of the claim so that the employer is
reasonably identifiable" then the NDA is also unenforceable against the
employer.275 All settlement agreements must include a notice as to the
consequences of the employee's public revelation of the facts of the
claim.27 6 Particularly broad is a provision that deems any waiver of a
"substantive or procedural right or remedy" unenforceable.27 7 The limits
of this provision have not yet been tested, but it likely prohibits arbitration
agreements, as they waive the employee's right to a jury trial. 27 8 This
provision would conflict with federal precedent on preemption discussed
above that upholds the enforceability of arbitration agreements.2 79
Finally, the New Jersey law provides for damages if the employer
retaliates against the employee for refusing to sign an NDA or for
disclosing information-subject to an NDA 8°

271. Id: § 10.195(2).
272. Id. § 10.195(4).
273. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12.7 (2019).
274. Id. § 10:5-12.8.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. § 10:5-12.7.
278. See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 342 (2011) ("The same
argument might apply to a rule classifying as unconscionable arbitration agreements that fail to abide
by the Federal Rules of Evidence, or that disallow an ultimate disposition by a jury.").
279. Id.; Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. _ 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018).
280.

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12.10.
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New York

New York's approach to its NDA law, passed in 2018, is to set forth
the procedures by which a valid NDA may be entered, requiring that it be
the "complainant's preference." 8' 1 The statute prohibits the use of NDAs
in settlement agreements in sexual harassment claims unless it is the
claimant's preference. 282 It also requires a 21 -day period for the claimant
to consider the NDA and seven days to revoke the agreement.283
8.

Oregon

The most recent entrant into this statutory arena is Oregon.284
Effective October 1, 2020, it is illegal in Oregon for an employer to enter
into an NDA with an employee or applicant that prevents the discussion
of discrimination or sexual assault that occurred at work or between
employees. 285 Employees or applicants may file administrative
complaints or lawsuits for violations of the ban on NDAs. 286 Thus, rather
than merely render NDAs unenforceable, Oregon has made their entrance
an unlawful employment practice.2 87
Like many other states, Oregon has included an exception to allow
for NDAs in settlement or severance agreements under two
circumstances: 1) the employee claiming discrimination or assault
requests the NDA and has seven days to revoke the agreement; or 2) the
employee is the individual who engaged in the unlawful discrimination or
assault according to the employer's good faith determination.2 88
9.

Tennessee

Tennessee's law focuses on NDAs in employment agreements. 289 It
states that an employer may not require that an employee or prospective
employee enter into an NDA with respect to sexual harassment as a
condition of employment. 29° The law applies to employment agreements
281.
282.

N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-336 (Consol. 2018).
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-336.

283.

Id.

284.

OR. REV. STAT. § 659A (2020).

285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. § 659A.370.
289. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 50-1-108 (West 2018).
290. Id.
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executed or renewed after May 15, 2018.291 Tennessee law does not
prohibit settlement agreements that include NDAs in sexual harassment
claims.29 2
10. Vermont
Vermont has banned employers from asking employees to waive any
substantive rights with regard to a sexual harassment complaint, except as
permitted by state or federal law. 293 The law also bans any agreement that
prohibits an employee from "opposing, disclosing, reporting, or
participating in an investigation of sexual harassment. '294 Vermont's law
has broad application, going beyond employees to cover all persons hired
to "perform work or services. ' '295

In addition to limiting an employer's ability to include NDAs and
other waivers in employment agreements, Vermont's law explicitly
provides that a settlement of a claim of sexual harassment cannot restrict
the employee from working for the employer. 296 The settlement
agreements must explicitly state that the agreement does not prevent the
claimant from lodging a complaint with the government, testifying in an
investigation of harassment, or complying with a discovery request in a
sexual harassment case.297

11. Virginia
Virginia's law prohibits employment agreements that have the
"purpose or effect of concealing the details relating to a claim of sexual
assault" as defined by Virginia law.2 98 Effective July 1, 2019, the Virginia
law does not address sexual harassment or settlement agreements of such
claims, although the original bill did include sexual harassment.29 9

291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Id.
Id.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495h(g)(1)(b) (West 2019).
Id. § 495h(g)(1)(a).
Id. § 495h(a)(2).
Id. § 495h(h)(1).
Id. § 495h(h)(2).
VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.01 (2019).
Va. B. Summary, 2019 Reg. Sess., H.B. 1820 (2019).
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12. Washington
Washington passed a law in March 2018 that prohibits employers
from requiring that employees sign an NDA that prevents discussion of
workplace sexual harassment or sexual assault as a condition of
employment. °° Washington's law covers discussion of harassment or
assault that occurs at the workplace, any incidents at work-related events,
between employees, or between employer and employee that take place
outside of the workplace. 31 Any such NDAs are void and
unenforceable.30 2 It is illegal for a Washington employer to retaliate
against an employee for disclosing or discussing sexual harassment or
assault.303
The Washington law does not prevent settlement agreements of
sexual harassment claims from including an NDA.3 04 In a separate statute,
however, Washington law provides that an NDA cannot prevent discovery
in a sexual harassment or sexual assault civil or administrative
proceeding.30 5 In those cases, the judge may impose an order to protect
the identity of the victim, unless the victim consents to public
30 6
disclosure.
B. ProposedState Legislation
Since the #MeToo movement began, bills limiting the use of NDAs
in sexual harassment claims have been introduced in many other state
legislatures 3 7 and the U.S. Congress. 30 8 Several additional states,
including Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, and West Virginia, are currently
considering bills. 3 9 Most of the proposed legislation echoes the laws
discussed above by banning the use of an NDA in an employment

300.

WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.210(1) (2018).

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.210(1).
Id. § 49.44.201(2).
Id. § 49.44.210(3).
Id. § 49.44.210(4).
Id. § 4.24.840(1).
Id.

307.

See Khadija Murad,

Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, NAT'L CON.

OF ST.

LEGISLATURES (Feb. 17, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/sexualharassment-in-the-workplace.aspx.
308. Ending the Monopoly of Power Over Workplace Harassment through Educating and
Reporting Act, H.R. 6406, 115th Cong. § 103 (2018).
309. Murad, supra note 307.
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agreement.3 1 ° Some provide exceptions to allow for confidential
settlement agreements in sexual harassment cases; others explicitly ban
those as well. 31 '
C. Other Statutory Optionsfor Limiting NDAs. Sunshine in
LitigationLaws
Many states already have "Sunshine in Litigation" statutes designed
to encourage transparency in civil litigation.3 12 For example, Florida's
Sunshine in Litigation Act prohibits a court from entering an order or
judgment for the purpose of concealing information related to a public
hazard.313 The Sunshine in Litigation Act also voids any agreements that
have the purpose of concealing information related to the public hazard.3 14
Commonly used in products liability cases to protect the public from
safety hazards, some commentators suggest that these laws could be
applied to the "public hazard" of a serial sexual predator.3 15 The Florida
statute defines public hazard as "an instrumentality, including but not
limited to any ...person ...that has caused and is likely to cause
injury. "316 Although never tested in court, it is a valid legal argument that
a serial sexual harasser is a person likely to cause injury. 317 If so
determined, a court would be prohibited by the Sunshine in Litigation Act
from enforcing an NDA that limits a victim's ability to talk about the
harassment.3 18 This approach to limiting enforcement of NDAs would be
reliant on a court defining each harasser as a public hazard.3" 9 The
unpredictable and extensive litigation required make this approach
unlikely to have an impact on the use of NDAs. Accusers would be forced
to come forward with their stories, wait to be sued for breach of their

310. See id.
311. See id.
312. See, e.g., DEL. R. Civ. P. RuLE 26 (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West 1990);
Ind. Trial Procedure 26(c) (2020); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.tit. 22, § 216.1 (2018) (applying to
"court records" only); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 132-1.3 (West 1989) (applying to settlements
involving public sector defendants only); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.095 (West 2018) (applying to
settlements involving public sector defendants only); WASH. REv. CODE § 4.24.611(2)(1994).
313.

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(3).

314. Id. § 69.081(4).
315. Kaminsky, supra note 149.
316. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(2).
317. See Prasad, supra note 154, at 2542 (advocating for the expansion of Sunshine Laws to
prevent secret settlements in sexual abuse cases).
318. Id.at2548.
319. Id.at 2544.
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NDA, and then use the Sunshine in Litigation Act as a defense.320
Alternatively, accusers would have to bring a sexual harassment lawsuit
against the wrongdoer, and then have the court rule under the Sunshine in
Litigation Act that they can provide evidence in that case without facing
damages for the breach of their NDA.3 21 The expense and risk involved
would be deterrents to almost all accusers.
D. ProposedFederalLaw: EMPOWER Act
In June 2018 a bipartisan group of senators introduced the
EMPOWER Act: Ending the Monopoly of Power Over Workplace
Harassment through Education and Reporting.32 2 The bill makes it illegal
for an employer to enter into an employment agreement that contains an
NDA that covers workplace harassment and to enforce such a clause.3 23
Like many state laws, there would be an exception to allow an NDA in a
settlement agreement.324 The EMPOWER Act was reintroduced in
Congress in 20 19.325
The second part of the EMPOWER Act uses the tax code to modify
treatment of payments related to workplace harassment and employment
discrimination. 326 The proposed law would prohibit taxpayers from
taking a deduction for payments made pursuant to anyjudgment, expenses
or attorney's fees, or insurance covering the defense or liability, in
litigation related to workplace harassment.32 7 As the current tax code
stands, taxpayers may deduct payments made in relation to civil
litigation.328 The EMPOWER Act would also exclude any settlement
payments or awards that a plaintiff in a harassment suit wins from the
329
taxpayer's gross income.

320. Id. at 2526.
321. See id. at 2518 ("NDAs are deliberately used by perpetrators to evade accountability for
claims of sexual harassment and assault.").
322. EMPOWER Act, S.2994 115th Cong. (2018).
323. Id. § 4(a)(1).
324. Id. § 4(b)(1).
325. S.574, 116th Congress (2019-2020); H.R. Res. 1521, 116th Congress (2019-2020).
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Anna Luczkow, Is your Lawsuit Tax Deductible? How to know when it is, and isn't,
deductible,

BUCKINGHAM,

DOOLITTLE

&

BURROUGHS,

LLC

(Nov.

8,

2019),

https://

www.jdsupra.com/Iegalnews/is-your-lawsuit-tax-deductible-how-to-7661 1/.
329. Ending the Monopoly of Power Over Workplace harassment through Education and
Reporting Act, S.574, 116th Cong. (2019-2020); H.R. Res. 1521, 116th Congress (2019-2020).
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In addition, the EMPOWER Act would ask the EEOC to set up a
confidential tip-line for employees to report workplace harassment.33 ° It
would also require that public companies disclose the number of
settlements, judgments, or awards entered against the company relating to
a harassment claim, and the amount paid as a result of those settlements
or judgments.33 1 The law would also require disclosure of whether there
have been three or more settlements or judgments entered related to a
particular employee, without identifying that person by name.332
The EMPOWER Act was referred to the judiciary and finance
committees in the spring of 2019."' 3 No further action has been taken.
V.

PROHIBITION OF NDAS THAT PREVENT REPORTING OF
FINANCIAL VIOLATIONS

To evaluate the best approach for limiting NDAs in sexual
harassment cases, it is helpful to look outside of the context of sexual
harassment and misconduct, at the use of NDAs in cases of violations of
securities laws. Just as the #MeToo movement revealed years of hidden
sexual harassment, the financial crisis of 2008 revealed wrongdoing by
banks and other financial institutions.33 4 . The legislative response to the
financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, set out a policy goal of incentivizing whistleblowers
within financial institutions. 335 As the SEC explains:
Assistance and information from a whistleblower who knows of
possible securities law violations can be among the most powerful
weapons in the law enforcement arsenal of the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Through their knowledge of the
circumstances and individuals involved, whistleblowers can help
the Commission identify possible fraud and other violations much
earlier than might otherwise have been possible. That allows the
Commission to minimize the harm to investors, better preserve
the integrity of the United States' capital markets, and more

330. EMPOWER Act, S. 2994, 115th Cong. § 5 (2018).
331. Id.§6.
332. Id. § 5.
333. EMPOWER Act, 166th Cong., Bill Tracking H.R. 1521 (2019).
334. Protecting Internal Whistleblowers, NAT'L WHISTLEBLOWER CTR., https:I/
www.whistleblowers.org/campaigns/save-the-dodd-frank-act (last visited Apr. 22, 2020).
335. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §929Z 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010) (Codified at 15 U.S.C. §780).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2020

35

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW JOURNAL

swiftly hold accountable
conduct. 3 6

those

responsible

[Vol. 37:2

for unlawful

Acknowledging the powerful role that whistleblowers play in
identifying fraud early, hence limiting harm, Congress created the Office
of the Whistleblower.3 3 7 This Office has the authority to provide
monetary awards to any whistleblower who provides original information
that relates to possible violations of federal securities laws.3 38 If the SEC
recovers a financial award or settlement in excess of $1 million as a result
of the information, the whistleblower is entitled to payment of a
percentage of the government recovery, ranging from 10-30 percent.33 9
Emphasizing the important role that whistleblowers play in preventing
illegal conduct, Dodd-Frank regulations include protections for the
whistleblower beyond these payments, including protection from
retaliation and a ban on employer actions that impede whistle-blowing.34 °
A.

Dodd-Frank'sBan on NDAs

Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") Rule 21F-17(a)
prohibits "any action to impede an individual from communicating
directly with the Commission staff about a possible securities law
violation, including enforcing, or threatening to enforce, a confidentiality
agreement ... with respect to such communications.,, 341 This rule was
adopted in 2011 as part of the SEC's efforts to establish the whistleblower
program.34 2 It was not until 2015, however, that the SEC began enforcing
Rule 21 F- 17 through a series of cases against public companies that had
provisions in employee separation agreements that prohibited or chilled
employee communications with the SEC staff about possible violations of
securities law.343 In none of these cases did the SEC find that an employee
tried to report wrongdoing and was retaliated against or that any

336.

Office of Whistleblower, U.S. S.E.C., https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower (last visited Apr.

22, 2020).
337. Id.
338. 17 C.F.R. § 240.2 1F-2(a) (2012).
339. Id. § 240.21F-5(b).

340. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (2012).
341. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-17(a).
342. White, supra note 30, at 1, 8 n.2 ("The whistleblower program was established pursuant to
Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6, which was added by the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 922, 11 1th Cong.,
2d sess. (July 21, 2010).").

343.

Id. at 1.
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employees were prevented from communicating with the SEC. 3" The
mere act of asking employees to sign these NDAs was enough for SEC
enforcement.345
The SEC's action against Merrill Lynch and its parent company
3 46
Bank of America in 2016 is an example of such an enforcement action.
Merrill Lynch entered into severance agreements with several employees
that banned employees from disclosing confidential information or trade
secrets "to any person or entity outside these entities except pursuant to
formal legal process or unless the former employee first obtained the
written approval of an authorized [Merrill Lynch] representative."34' 7 The
NDAs in the severance agreements essentially did not permit voluntary
disclosure of confidential information to government agencies or
3 48
courts.
Given a clear violation of Rule 21 F-17, Merrill Lynch admitted
wrongdoing, paid a $415 million fine and revised its confidentiality
agreements, policies, and procedures.3 49 Merrill Lynch and Bank of
America also implemented a mandatory annual whistleblower-training
program for all employees and agreed to "annually provide employees
with a summary of their rights and protections under the SEC's
Whistleblower Program. "350
As evidenced by the Merrill Lynch example, the NDAs at issue in
most SEC enforcement actions range from a direct prohibition of speaking
with the SEC or other government agencies to limits on communications
with the government (for example requiring a court order to allow the
employee to speak).3 51 Many of the NDAs required employees to notify
the company before speaking to the government. In the most extreme
cases the agreements required that the employee waive the right to receive
a monetary award for reporting to a government agency.35 2 The SEC
found all of these NDAs to be in violation of Rule 21F-17(a), while

344. White, supra note 30, at 1-2.
345. Id. at 2.
346. See generally Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
78141, 2016 WL 4363431 (June 23, 2016) (enforcing a cease-and-desist of company proceedings
under sections 15(b) and 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
347. Id. at 19.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 20, 22.
350. Lisa Banks, The SEC's Increasing Focus on Employer-Employee Confidentiality
Agreements,
CORP.
COMPLIANCE
INSIGHTS
(Aug.
1,
2016),
https://
www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/secs-increasing-focus-employer-employee-confidentialityagreements!.
351. White, supra note 30, at 7.
352. Id.
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explicitly acknowledging that there was no evidence of any employee
being stopped from communicating with the government.3 5 3
Thus far, all of the companies charged with violations of Rule 21F17(a) have settled with the SEC.354 In addition to agreeing to eliminate
the violative NDAs from all employee agreements, many of the
settlements required that the companies include an affirmative statement
of the employee's right to be a whistleblower in any separation
agreement.3 55 This may be likely a response to cases such as that of
SandRidge Energy, which settled charges of a violation of Rule 21 F- 17(a)
in December 2016.356 SandRidge used a form separation agreement from
August 2011 through April 2015 that prohibited a former employee from
voluntarily cooperating with a government agency in any complaint or
investigation of the company.3 57 The agreement included an NDA that
prohibited disclosure of confidential information to any other person or
organization, including any government agency.3 58 After Rule 21 F-17(a)
was adopted, several employees requested that the severance agreements
be modified. 359 SandRidge modified the language to comply with Rule
21 F-17(a) only for those employees that specifically asked, but continued
to use the problematic language with all other employees.3 60 In other
words, if an employee was unaware of their right to be a whistleblower
under Rule 21F, SandRidge took advantage and asked them to sign the
NDA.36 1 The SandRidge case exemplifies one of the challenges of
legislation prohibiting the use of NDAs: unless an employee is aware that
the NDA is illegal, the employee's willingness to report wrongdoing will
be chilled by the mere fact of being asked to sign the NDA.36 2 If the public
policy goal is to encourage employees to report wrongdoing by their
employers, as it is in Dodd-Frank's whistleblower program, any NDA law
must require affirmative disclosure of the employee's right to report
wrongdoing.

353. White, supra note 30, at 1-2.
354. Id. at 1.
355. Id. at 7.
356. SandRidge Energy, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-79607, 11, S.E.C. Docket 14 (Dec.
20, 2016).
357. SandRidge Order 16.
358. Id. 7.
359. Id. 9.
360. Id. M 9-12.
361. Id.
362. See id.
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VI.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Although SEC Rule 21F offers a useful example of NDA regulation,
NDAs relating to sexual harassment require a different approach because
of concerns for accuser privacy and leverage in negotiation. Just as the
SEC has emphasized the importance of whistleblowers in stopping current
and future illegal activity, the ability of sexual harassment accusers to
speak out is essential to preventing future workplace sexual harassment.
The #MeToo movement has revealed too many serial harassers in
workplaces across many industries.36 3 Yet, speaking out about sexual
harassment is different from blowing the whistle on securities violations
by your employer. Many sexual harassment accusers prefer that their
stories remain confidential because of the social stigma attached to being
a victim of harassment.3 64 Attorneys of accusers have noted that their
clients would not have come forward without the promise of
confidentiality.365 Many accusers never work in the same industry
again.3 66 The #MeToo movement has encouraged victims of harassment
to speak out, but the implications of doing so are still negative.36 7 A total
ban on the use of NDAs that cover sexual harassment claims, akin to the
ban on NDAs for securities regulation violations in Rule 21F-17(a) of
Dodd-Frank, might reduce workplace harassment by repeat offenders by
making every claim public. But given our current cultural norms around
sexual harassment and accusers' interests, a more nuanced approach is
required for NDAs that cover sexual harassment claims.
The best approach to balancing the need to prevent future
wrongdoing with respect for accusers is three-pronged: 1) limits (but not
a total ban) on the use of NDAs; 2) notification to all employees of their
rights under the NDA laws; and 3) public reporting requirements for
employers. Many of the new or proposed NDA laws require one or two
363. See Farrow, supra note 71.
364. See id. (stating that "victims may actually prefer such [NDA] agreements" because "some
people don't want their parents, their friends, members of their community to know").
365. Id.
366.

Molly Redden, 'You'll never work again': women tell how sexual harassment broke their

careers, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/2 I/womensexual-harassment-work-careers-harvey-weinstein.
367. Ksenia Keplinger et al., Women at work: Changes in sexual harassmentbetween September
2016 and September 2018, PLOS ONE (July 17, 2019), https://joumals.plos.org/plosone/article
/related?id=10.1371/joumal.pone.0218313. A study comparing data collected from women in 2016
to women in 2018 did find decreased levels of stigma around being a victim of sexual harassment.
Id. Women reported less self-blame and less shame. Id. The study did show increased occurrences
of gender harassment when comparing 2016 to 2018. Id. Authors suggest this increase is due to a
rise in hostility toward women as part of a backlash to #MeToo. Id.
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of these aspects; none do all three. 368 But without each, the others will be
ineffective.
Before more explanation, a word on the best source of regulation.
As discussed above, reliance on the courts alone to limit the use of NDAs
is unrealistic.3 6 9 Most accusers never file lawsuits, and having NDAs in
place has a chilling effect regardless of the enforceability of those
contracts.3 70 Thus, a legislative approach would be more effective.
Although contract law is a matter of state law, sexual harassment is
prohibited under federal law. 371 As Justice Ginsburg has noted, "[t]he
laws are there, the laws are in place."3 7 If the goal of limiting NDAs is
to prevent serial harassment, and not a critique of contract law more
generally, then it makes most sense for the legislation to be part of the
federal prohibition on sexual harassment under Title VII. Also, given the
EEOC's current role in enforcing regulations to make employees aware
of their rights under Title VII (and other employment laws), that agency
would be well situated to implement the notification prong of the
recommended policy.3 73 Accordingly, this article refers to Congress
below.
A.

Limits on the Use of NDAs in Sexual HarassmentClaims

Many states have recognized the use of NDAs in employment
agreements that prohibit disclosure of sexual harassment claims is bad
public policy.374 These blanket NDAs, signed upon entry into
employment, allow predators to repeatedly victimize employees with little
consequence.3 75 These expansive contracts prevent employees from filing
litigation, administrative complaints, internal complaints, or speaking to
the press, during employment or after.376 They also prohibit disclosure of
wrongdoing by observers - those third parties who might otherwise act as

368. See OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.375 (2020) (prohibiting NDAs that prevent the discussion of
discrimination or assault that occurred at work or between employees); CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1001
(2019) (prohibiting NDAs that limit ability to participate in civil or administrative claim); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21 § 495h(g)(1) (2019) (requiring that settlement agreements clearly state that such
agreements do not prevent party from making a complaint with the government).
369. See supra Section III.
370. See Farrow, supra note 71.
371.

ROSEN, supra note 143.

372.
373.
374.
375.
376.

See id. at 191 ("We have the legal reforms; we have had them for a long time. Title VII.").

Id.
Id.
Lobel, supra note 221.
Id.
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whistleblowers.3 77 Following the SEC's lead on protecting and
incentivizing whistleblowers, Congress should ban NDAs that prohibit
disclosure of facts or circumstances related to sexual harassment, sexual
assault, rape, or discrimination, in any employment agreement. States
such as New Jersey, Maryland, and Arizona have approached this issue
by prohibiting the enforcement of such blanket NDAs.37 8 Although this
prohibition is a start, mere entrance into NDAs chill speech, as
acknowledged by the SEC's approach.37 9 It is unlikely that an employee
would be willing to go to court to prevent enforcement of NDA in order
to disclose wrongdoing.
A better approach would be similar to that of Oregon. Oregon's new
law prohibits entry into an NDA that prevents the discussion of
discrimination or sexual assault that occurred at work or between
employees.38 ° Should an employer ask an employee to enter such 3an
81
agreement, the law provides that the employee may seek damages.
Oregon's approach is similar to the SEC's enforcement of Rule 21 F-7(a)
where the employer never tried to enforce the NDA against the
employee.3 8 2 Banning the use of NDAs in employment agreements that
cover sexual harassment, sexual assault, rape or discrimination, is
required to avoid chilling the speech of accusers.
Relatedly, the media coverage of the Weinstein Company NDAs
revealed a particularly invidious form of NDA: an employment agreement
that prohibited disclosure of any information "concerning the personal,
social or business activities" of Weinstein and his brother as coChairmen.3 83 NDAs play an important role in protecting business's trade
secrets and confidential information, but prohibiting disclosure of
executives' personal or social activities is merely a way to silence
accusers. Any legislation prohibiting the use of NDAs in employment
agreements must also prohibit agreements silencing information unrelated
to business interests of the employer.
Many state laws prohibit the use of NDAs that limit disclosure of
formal complaints and lawsuits.384 For example, in Arizona an NDA that
377. Id.
378. Jeffrey Johnson, Non-DisclosureAgreements and Arbitration Clauses in the #MeToo Era,
JD SUPRA (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/non-disclosure-agreements-and30226/.
379. OR. REV. STAT. § 659A (2020).
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. See id.
383. See Farrow, supra note 71.
384. Johnson, supra note 378.
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prohibits participation in a criminal proceeding is illegal. 385 California's
law is broader, prohibiting NDAs that limit your ability to participate in a
civil or administrative claim.3 86 But many accusers never reach the
courthouse or administrative hearing; they make an internal complaint
with their employer first.3 8 7 A better approach is seen in Vermont and
Washington,3 88 which prohibit agreements that limit "the discussion of'
sexual harassment or sexual assault.38 9 The broader prohibition protects
accusers' rights to complain internally, talk to friends, family, medical
professionals, and to report the wrongdoing to the media.3 9° One lesson
of the #MeToo movement has been the powerful role of the media in
revealing the extent of workplace harassment.
B. ProtectionofAccusers'Rights to ConfidentialSettlements
Although they hide illegal and unethical behavior, NDAs may help
accusers in sexual harassment cases. First, privacy from an NDA allows
accusers to avoid the stigma of discussing a sexual harassment incident.3 91
Claims of sexual harassment have different societal implications for
accusers than those faced by other whistleblowers.3 92 Although it is a
difficult choice to be a whistleblower in any context, the decision to report
sexual harassment as a victim or a bystander is particularly fraught. 393
Although it is unfair, these complaints often harm an accuser's reputation
as everything in the victim's background becomes fair play.3 94 As
attorney Lisa Bloom has noted, the scrutiny involved in a sexual
harassment claim can include "public shaming and difficulty in gaining
new employment."3' 95 Although many suggest that an NDA may reduce
the difficulty of finding a new job,396 there are examples of women who

385. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-720 (2018).
386. CAL. CODE. CIv. PROC. § 1001 (2019).
387. See Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 112, at 173.
388. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495h(g)(1)(b) (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44 (2018).
389. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495h(g)(1)(b) (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44 (2018).
390. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495h(g)(1)(b) (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44 (2018).
391. Annie Hill, Nondisclosure Agreements: Sexual Harassment and the Contract of Silence,
GENDER POL'Y REP. (Nov. 14, 2017), https://genderpolicyreport.umn.edu/nondisclosure-agreementssexual-harassment-and-the-contract-of-silence/.
392. See Redden, supra note 366.
393. Id.
394. See Perman, supra note 56.
395. Id.
396. Stanley D. Bernstein & Stephanie M. Beige, NDAs Can Help Harassment Victims, WALL
STREET J. (Aug. 12, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ndas-arent-all-bad-for-harassment-victims1534110226.
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signed NDAs but have still been "black-listed" due to whisper
campaigns. 397 Rudi Bakhtiar was a star of CNN Headline News before
she had a successful career at Fox News.3 98 Then she accused Fox News
anchor Brian of sexual harassment, was immediately fired and has never
returned to television. 399 Juliet Huddy, another Fox News anchor, accused
former Fox News anchor Bill O'Reilly of sexual harassment that began in
2011 . She was retaliated against after complaining, as she was demoted
st
to a local news show.4" 1 Huddy reportedly received a settlement from 21
Century Fox as part of the company's internal investigation of Gretchen
Carlson's complaint.4 0 2 In the settlement, "she agreed not to 'disparage,
malign or defame' the parties; the company, on its behalf and on the behalf
of Mr. O'Reilly and Mr. Abernethy, agreed not to 'disparage, malign or
defame' Ms. Huddy."4 °3 Huddy's NDA includes a liquidated damages
4
clause that imposes a penalty of $500,000 per infringement. " Huddy has
not worked in television again, although she hosts a radio show. 40 5 It is
difficult to explain your job departure if you are prohibited from
explaining the circumstances thereof. The most important benefit of an
NDA may be that the employer's primary incentive to pay a monetary
settlement is confidentiality. 406 Thus silence is often the accuser's greatest
bargaining chip in settlement negotiations.
Given the unique circumstances surrounding claims of sexual
harassment, a blanket ban on all NDAs similar to that of SEC Rule 21F7(a) could be -harmful to accusers. An exception to the ban on use of
NDAs should exist for settlement agreements, but only at the request of
the victim. Although the EMPOWER Act includes an exception for the
use of NDAs in settlement agreements, the NDA can be invoked by either
397. See id.
398. See Gabriel Sherman, How Fox News Firedand Silenced a Female Reporter Who Alleged
Sexual Harassment, N.Y. MAG. (July 23, 2016), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2016/07/how-foxnews-fired-and-silenced-an-ailes-accuser.html.
399.

Id.; see also Megyn Kelly Presents: A Response to "Bombshell" - Full Discussion,

YoU'uBE (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v--MmSz7HqkI9s.
400. See Steel & Schmidt, supranote 197.
401. Emily Steel & Michael S. Schmidt, Fox News Settled Sexual HarassmentAllegations
Against Bill O'Reilly, Documents Show, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017
/01/10/business/media/bill-oreilly-sexual-harassment-fox-news-juliet-huddy.html.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. See id.
405. Megyn Kelly Presents: A Response to "Bombshell" - Full Discussion,supra note 399.
406. Martin Aron et al., New Jersey Prohibits Enforcement of Non-Disclosure Provisions in
Settlement Agreements, Other Contracts, NAT'L L. REv. (Mar. 21, 2019), https://
www.natlawreview.com/article/new-jersey-prohibits-enforcement-non-disclosure-provisionssettlement-agreements.
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party.4 °7 This would allow the employer, the party with more negotiating
power in most cases, to pressure the employee to enter into the NDA or
lose the settlement payment. A better approach would be akin to that of
Oregon, where NDAs are allowed in settlement or severance agreements
under two circumstances: 1) the employee claiming discrimination or
assault requests the NDA and has seven days to revoke the agreement; or
2) the employee is the individual who engaged in the unlawful
discrimination or assault according to the employer's good faith
determination.4" 8 Similarly, New York's law allows an NDA in a
severance agreement only at the request of the victim.4" 9 Like Oregon, to
protect the victim from duress during contract negotiation as we saw in
the negotiation between Perkins and Weinstein, the New York law
requires a 2 1-day period for the claimant to consider the NDA and seven
days to revoke the agreement. 410 Given the power dynamics at play in any
sexual harassment claim, protections against duress are essential.
To summarize, the most effective legislation would prohibit all
employment agreement NDAs related to incidents of sexual harassment,
but allow an exception for NDAs entered in settlement agreements at the
411
request of the accuser, with time for consideration and revocation.
C. Noticefor Employees
Limits on the use of NDAs in sexual harassment cases are
meaningless if employees are unaware of the law. If an employee does
not know that an NDA would be unenforceable or illegal, the employer
can chill the employee's speech by merely including the NDA in an
employment agreement or offering it as a term of a settlement or
severance. Employees will hesitate to spend the money or time to litigate
the enforceability of the NDA. Where the NDAs would have been
unenforceable under existing law - in the cases of testimony in court or
reporting discrimination claims to the government - we have seen
employees are unwilling to speak out when they have signed an NDA.412

407. EMPOWER Act, S.2994, 115th Congress (2018).
408. OR. REV. STAT. § 659A (2020).
409. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-336 (Consol. 2018).
410. Id.
411. See generally id. (stating that New York law only allows NDAs at the request of the victim
and requires a twenty-one-day period for the claimant to consider the NDA and seven days to revoke
the agreement).
412. Johnson, supra note 378.
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This chilling effect is particularly prominent where the NDA includes a
liquidated damages provision.4 13
Some states, recognizing the need for employees to be aware of their
rights, have required that any settlement or severance agreement explain
any statutory limits on the enforceability of the NDA.4 14 For example, in
Vermont, settlement agreements must explicitly state that the agreement
does not prevent the claimant from lodging a complaint with the
government, testifying in an investigation of harassment, or complying
with a discovery request in a sexual harassment case. 415 Echoing this
policy are the settlements entered with the SEC in which companies
accused of violating Rule 21F have agreed to include an affirmative
statement of the right to be a whistleblower in all severance agreements.4 16
To the extent that laws in New York and Oregon allow the accuser time
to consider the NDA before signing the agreement, and seven days to
revoke after signing, there is at least an implicit requirement to make the
employee aware of their rights under the statute. 417 But waiting until the
employee is faced with signing the agreement to obtain the settlement
payment is insufficient to avoid chilling speech or duress. Although in
New York an employer must distribute a sexual harassment policy and
complaint form to employees, the state's "model policy" does not
reference the NDA law.418 Thus, if employers were to adapt the model
policy, it is possible their employees would be unaware of their rights
4 19
under the NDA-law.
Any law that limits the use of NDAs must require notice to all
employees of their rights. For an example of how this works, consider
Title VII. 42° It requires an employer to post a notice describing the federal
413. See generally Romo, supra note 223 (explaining that where a victim is required to pay up
to $1 million for a breach, it is safe to say that such a provision would keep the victim from speaking
out as such sums are substantial).
414. See generally VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495h(g)(1)(2018) (explaining requirements for
settlement agreements).
415. Id.
416. White, supra note 30, at 7.
417. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-336 l(b) (Consol. 2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.370(3)(a)
(2019) (effective Oct. 1, 2020).
418. See Bina Nayee, Article, The Efficacy of New York's Qualified Prohibitionon NDAs and
Reforms That Can Protect Sexual HarassmentSurvivors, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. ONLINE 73, 74-75
(2019) (citing N.Y. ST. DEP'T OF LAB. SEXUAL HARASSMENT POLICY FOR ALL EMPLOYERS IN NEW

https://www.ny.gov/sites/ny.gov/files/atoms/files
YORK
STATE,
/SexualHarassmentPreventionModelPolicy.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2020)).
419. Id.
420. See Christine Day, Legal Update: New Penalty for 'EEO is the law' Poster Failures,
LAWROOM BLOG (June 3, 2016), http://blog.lawroom.com/legal-update/legal-update-new-.penalty

eeothelaw poster failures/.
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laws prohibiting discrimination.4 2 1 This notice, called the "Equal
Employment Opportunity is the Law" poster, is prepared by the EEOC
and must be posted in a conspicuous location in the workplace.4 22 As a
result of these posters, as well as decades of cultural change, it may be
presumed that a growing number of Americans are aware of their rights
with regard to anti-discrimination laws.4 23 Given the essential role of
whistleblowers in preventing future sexual harassment, all statutes
limiting the use of NDAs in these cases should require that employees be
notified of their rights - before they become victims. As is the case for
failure to post the "Equal Employment Opportunity is the Law" poster,424
failure to post information about a whistleblower's rights should result in
a civil fine.42 5
D. PublicReporting by Employer of Sexual HarassmentClaims
Large employers - those subject to Title VII - should be required to
report annually, without any names, the number of sexual harassment
complaints received. It is an abomination that the Weinstein Company
knew about dozens of claims of sexual harassment and never had to report
to any government agency.426 It is equally offensive that Wynn Resorts,
already highly regulated as a casino, failed to report multiple rape
allegations by Mr. Wynn.42 7 Increased transparency will not only
encourage accusers to access the legal system, it will also allow market
forces to encourage companies to address serial harassers. A negative
report of excessive numbers of harassment claims could impact share
price for public companies 428 and employee job satisfaction and retention

421. Day, supra note 420.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id. ("The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has issued a final rule
raising the penalty from $210 to $525 for failure to post the 'Equal Employment Opportunity is the
law' poster.").
425. Id.
426. See supra Section H.
427. See supra Section II.
428. Elizabeth Winkler, #MeToo Is Not a Buying Opportunityfor Investors, WALL STREET J.
(July 12, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/metoo-is-not-a-buying-opportnity-for-investors1531387801 (noting that it appears, so far, that share prices are only impacted in the short term by
sexual harassment accusations against leadership); see also Samantha Cooney, CompaniesAre Losing
Millions After #MeToo Allegations Like Kate Upton's Claim Against Guess' Paul Marciano, TIME

(Feb. 2, 2018), https://time.com/5130340/kate-upton-guess-stock-price/.
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for all companies.4 29 These market pressures may incentivize boards to
prioritize prevention of harassment.43 °
The EMPOWER Act incorporates the need for reporting by requiring
that public companies disclose the number of settlements, judgments or
awards entered against the company, the amount paid as a result of those
settlements or judgments, relating to a harassment claim. 43 1 The law
would also require disclosure of whether there have been three or more
settlements or judgments entered related to a particular employee, without
identifying that person by name.432 Requiring these disclosures is not
about shaming or denying due process to the accused.433 Disclosure of
the aggregate numbers of harassment claims in a company would alert the
EEOC to concerns about specific companies, allowing for investigation.
CONCLUSION

The #MeToo movement created a wave of legislation intended to
bring sexual harassment out of the shadows.434 The use of NDAs, once a
simple contract used to protect trade secrets, to silence accusers has
enabled serial harassers and their enablers to carry on without
repercussion for decades. Without increased transparency, serial harassers
will be allowed to continue their unethical, illegal, and often criminal,
behavior. 435 The worst of this continued harassment is the harm caused
to the accusers. But continued harassment creates collateral damage for
all company stakeholders through decreased employee morale, loss of

429. See Heather Antecol et al., Gender-biased behavior at work: Exploring the relationship
between sexual harassmentand sex discrimination,30 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 782, 783 (2009) (showing
that sexual harassment decreases job satisfaction); Rebecca S. Merkin & Muhammad Kamal Shah,
The impact of sexual harassmenton job satisfaction,'turnoverintentions, and absenteeism:findings
from Pakistan compared to the United States, 3 SPRINGERPLUS 215 (2014) (finding that sexual
harassment is likely to increase turnover by reducing job satisfaction).
430. Id. at 784 ("[P]revious research concludes that workers' perceptions of harassment and
discrimination are closely related to their labor market behavior.").
431. EMPOWER Act, S. 2994, § 105, 115th Cong. (2018).
432. Id.
433. See id. ("[l]nformation obtained can be used only for the purpose of investigation related to
the submitted complaint or complaints, in full compliance with applicable due process
requirements.").
434. See ME Too, supra note 54:
435. See supra Section I.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2020

47

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 37:2

employees, 43 6 legal expenses, and when finally revealed, loss to the
shareholders.4 37
The legislative efforts to address the use of NDAs in sexual
harassment claims are encouraging. 438 But, a review of that legislation
and comparison to other frameworks of whistleblower protection, like that
of the SEC, demonstrates that no current or proposed law does enough to
address the problem. 43 9 Although limits on NDAs are needed, there are
strong ethical and policy reasons for respecting the accuser's desire for
privacy.440 To balance the competing priorities, the best approach would
be federal legislation that: 1) limits (but not a total ban on) the use of
NDAs related to sexual harassment; 2) requires notification to all
employees of their rights under the NDA laws; and 3) imposes public
reporting requirements for employers." 1 This balanced approach will
stop companies from using contract law as a silencing tool in sexual
harassment cases and empower accusers through knowledge of their
rights. 42

436. See Winkler, supra note 428.
437. See Cooney, supra note 428. Even if the share prices only drop in the short term,
shareholders may be unwilling to spend company funds on large settlements to enable the company
executives to harass unfettered. Id. In the end, we are all replaceable. Id.
438. See supra Section IV.
439. See supra Section IV.
440. See Harris, supra note 27.
441. See supra Section VI.
442. See supra Section VI.
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